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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The issue subject to this appeal is whether Nevada
Power Company may refuse to produce to Arco Coal Sales Company
and Beaver Creek Coal Company transcripts of depositions taken
by Trail Mountain Coal Company of officers and employees of
Nevada Power Company in a related federal lawsuit, which
transcripts are within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1), U.R.C.P., on
the ground that the deposition transcripts are the work product
of Nevada Power Company13 counsel.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case

Trail Mountain Coal Company ("Trail Mountain")
initiated this lawsuit against Arco Coal Sales Company ("Arco")
and Beaver Creek Coal Company ("Beaver Creek") on April 4,
1986c

Trail Mountain alleges that Beaver Creek breached a coal

supply contract entered into between Beaver Creek and Trail
Mountain (the "Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract"), which
provides that Beaver Creek will purchase from Trail Mountain a
certain quantity of coal over a period of years. Trail
Mountain claims that Beaver Creek breached that contract by
refusing to purchase the coal.

Trail Mountain further alleges

that Arco wrongfully induced Beaver Creek to breach the Beaver
Creek-Trail Mountain Contract.

Trail Mountain seeks

compensatory and punitive damages in excess of $36,000,000 from
Arco and Beaver Creek.

Arco and Beaver Creek have denied liability and
contend that the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract was
repudiated and cancelled by Trail Mountain by its failure to
give assurance, after proper demand by Beaver Creek, that the
coal would satisfy the quality requirements of that contract.
In addition, Arco and Beaver Creek filed a Third-Party
Complaint against Nevada Power Company ("NPC") in which it is
alleged that if Arco or Beaver Creek is found liable to Trail
Mountain, NPC is obligated to indemnify Arco or Beaver Creek
against that liability.

NPC's obligations to Arco and Beaver

Creek arise out of the interrelationship of NPC, Trail
Mountain, Beaver Creek and Arco and the contracts existing
between the parties, as hereafter explained.
2.

Course Of Proceedings And Disposition
By District Court

This matter presently is before the Court on
interlocutory appeal from an order denying Arco and Beaver
Creek's motion to compel production by NPC of transcripts of
depositions taken by Trail Mountain of NPC witnesses in a
related federal lawsuit.

Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Nevada

Power Co., Civil No. C-84-0686G ("the federal action").

In

response to an informal request from Arco and Beaver Creek,

The transcript of the argument on the Motion to
Compel is paginated separately and is cited herein as Tr. Motion
to Compel. All other citations to the record are designated R.

Q_

Trail Mountain voluntarily provided copies of the transcripts
of its witnesses' depositions.

(Tr. Motion to Compel at 11).

NPC, however, refused to provide copies of the transcripts of
its witnesses' depositions.

(R. 293). Consequently, Arco and

Beaver Creek made a formal request for production pursuant to
Rule 34, U.R.C.P. (R. 284). NPC objected to Arco and Beaver
Creek's request on the grounds that the deposition transcripts
are work product.

(R. 346, 359). Arco and Beaver Creek then

filed a motion to compel, (R. 287), that was argued before the
district court on November 17, 1986.

(Tr. Motion to Compel).

On November 24, 1986, the district court issued its Ruling On
Motion for Production of Documents denying Arco and Beaver
Creek's motion.

(R. 372-74).

By order dated January 28, 1987, this Court granted
Arco and Beaver Creek's Motion for Leave to File an
Interlocutory Appeal. Arco and Beaver Creek filed a Motion for
Summary Disposition on March 2, 1987. The motion was denied by
Order dated April 8, 1987.
3.

Statement Of Relevant Facts

The Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract at issue in
this action is one of three related coal supply contracts
involving Beaver Creek, Trail Mountain and NPC. The
relationship between these contracts establishes the context in
which the pending dispute arose.

The Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract provides that
Trail Mountain will sell 120,000 tons of coal per year to
Beaver Creek for a period of fifteen years.

(R. 74-75).

The

Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract explicitly states that NPC
is the ultimate consumer of the coal to be supplied by Trail
Mountain to Beaver Creek under that contract.

(R. 86). As a

result of that fact, the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract
requires the coal supplied by Trail Mountain to be "of a
quality satisfactory for use in the coal fired units of the
Reid Gardner Station of the Nevada Power Company."

(R. 76).

As contemplated under the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain
Contract, Beaver Creek entered into a separate contract with
NPC ("the Beaver Creek-NPC Contract"), which provides that
Beaver Creek will sell 275,000 tons of coal per year to NPC for
a period of fifteen years.

(R. 40). The Beaver Creek-NPC

Contract expressly provides that Trail Mountain may be one
source of the coal to be supplied by Beaver Creek to NPC under
that contract.

(R. 42). The Beaver Creek-NPC Contract also

provides that the coal sold to NPC "shall be of a quality
satisfactory for use in the coal fired units of the Reid
Gardner Station."

(R. 43).

The third related contract was between Trail Mountain
and NPC (the "Trail Mountain-NPC Contract"), and provided that
Trial Mountain would sell 300,000 tons per year of coal to NPC
for a period of fifteen years.

-S-

(R. 22, 23). The Trail

Mountain-NPC Contract required the Trail Mountain coal to meet
certain specific quality characteristics, including a
requirement that the coal contain a maximum of three percent
sodium oxide in the ash.

(R. 24).

On March 20, 1984, NPC, by letter, notified Trail
Mountain that NPC was suspending further deliveries under the
Trail Mountain-NPC Contract because the coal delivered by Trail
Mountain did not satisfy the sodium oxide limit contained in
the contract.

(R. 10, 13, 108). NPC claimed that the

excessive sodium oxide in Trail Mountain's coal was causing
operational problems at NPC?s Reid Gardner Station. NPC
informed Beaver Creek of its suspension of deliveries under the
Trail Mountain-NPC Contract by letter dated March 22, 1984.
(R. 109).
After receiving the notice of suspension from NPC,
Beaver Creek, pursuant to Section 70A-2-609, Utah Code Ann.,
demanded adequate assurance from Trail Mountain that the coal
supplied by Trail Mountain to Beaver Creek would be
satisfactory for use in NPCfs Reid Gardner Station, as
specifically required under the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain
Contract.

The demand was made on May 9, 1984.

(R. 11, 131).

Trail Mountain did not provide any assurance to Beaver Creek,
as required by Section 70A-2-609.

The Beaver Creek-Trail

Mountain Contract therefore was repudiated by Trail Mountain
and was terminated,,

(R. 131). In August 1984, NPC

terminated the Trail Mountain-NPC Contract due to Trail
Mountain's failure to correct the sodium oxide problem.

In

response, Trail Mountain initiated the federal action against
NPC.

(R. 13). In the federal action, Trail Mountain alleged

that NPC had breached the Trail Mountain-NPC Contract by
refusing to accept delivery of coal under that contract. 3

In

response to Trail Mountain's Complaint, NPC reiterated its
claims that Trail Mountain's coal failed to satisfy the sodium

Section 70A-2-609 permits a party to a contract to
demand adequate assurance of due performance when "reasonable
grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance" of
another party to the contract. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-609(1)
(1977). The party demanding assurance may suspend performance
of the contract "if commercially reasonable." Id. If the
party from whom assurance has been demanded fails to respond
within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty days, the failure
constitutes a repudiation of the contract. Id. § 70A-2-609(4).
3
Complaint ITU 25, 26. A copy of the Complaint
filed by Trail Mountain in the federal action is appended hereto
as Appendix 1. Pursuant to Rule 201(d), Utah Rules of Evidence,
Arco and Beaver Creek request that the Court take judicial
notice of the existence of the federal action and of the
allegations made by the parties to that proceeding. Although
these matters are not part of the record, matters such as these
may be judicially noticed and considered by an appellate court.
4 Am Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 492 (1962). Arco and Beaver
Creek are not asking the Court to accept the veracity of the
allegations made in the federal action, but only to take notice
of the fact that NPC, Trail Mountain and Atlantic Richfield
Company took certain positions or made certain allegations in
that action.

"7

oxide requirement of the contract.

In addition NPC alleged

that the quality problems with the Trail Mountain coal had
caused operating problems at its Reid Gardner Station.

NPC

sought damages from Trail Mountain of $64,000 for each day that
a Reid Gardner Station unit was shutdown due to problems caused
by Trail Mountain coal.
In March 1985, Trail Mountain filed an Amended
Complaint naming Atlantic Richfield Company, Arco and Beaver
Creek's parent corporation, as a defendant.

Trail Mountain

repeated its allegations against NPC and further alleged that
Atlantic Richfield Company had breached the Beaver Creek-Trail
o

Mountain Contract.

NPCfs responsive pleading to the Amended

Complaint reasserted the factual defenses and claims raised in
Answer and Counterclaim 11 10 at 4; 11 21 at 8. A
copy of the Answer and Counterclaim filed by NPC in the federal
action is appended hereto as Appendix 2. Arco and Beaver Creek
request the Court to take judicial notice of NPCfs Answer and
Counterclaim to the extent and on the basis set forth in note
3, supra.
Answer and Counterclaim 1TU 4, 5 at 21.
Answer and Counterclaim ITU 19, 22 at 26-27, 11 5
at 30.
A copy of the Amended Complaint filed by Trail
Mountain in the federal action is appended hereto as Appendix
3. Arco and Beaver Creek request the Court to take judicial
notice of Trail Mountain's Amended Complaint to the extent and
on the basis set forth in note 3, supra.
g
Amended Complaint IT 52.

_Q_

NPC's Answer and also alleged that NPC "reasonably determined"
that the Trail Mountain coal did not comply with the quality
9
requirements of the Beaver Creek-NPC Contract.
Atlantic
Richfield Company moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint
because Beaver Creek was the real party in interest.

Since

adding Beaver Creek as a party would destroy the basis for
federal jurisdiction over the case, Trail Mountain filed a
motion to drop Atlantic Richfield Company as a defendant.
Neither Atlantic Richfield Company's motion to dismiss, nor
Trail Mountain's motion to drop a party was heard by or ruled
upon by the federal court.

Instead, after some discovery had

been completed, including the taking of the depositions at
issue on this appeal, Trail Mountain and NPC settled their
dispute and Trail Mountain's claims against Atlantic Richfield

Amended Answer to Amended Complaint and Amended
Counterclaim IT 25 at 11-12; IT 56 at 21; IT IT 4, 5 at 26-27; 1T 24
at 34 and 11 16 at 40. A copy of NPC's Amended Answer to
Amended Complaint and Amended Counterclaim is appended hereto
as Appendix 4. Arco and Beaver Creek request the Court to take
judicial notice of NPC's amended pleading to the extent and on
the basis set forth in note 3, supra.
Copies of Trail Mountain's Motion to Drop
Defendant Atlantic Richfield and its Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion to Drop Defendant Atlantic Richfield Company
are appended hereto as Appendices 5 and 6, respectively. Arco
and Beaver Creek request the Court to take judicial notice of
Trail Mountain's motion and memorandum to the extent and on the
basis set forth in note 3, supra.

_a_

Company were dismissed without prejudice.
As part of their settlement agreement, Trail Mountain
and NPC entered into a new coal supply contract (the "Trail
Mountain-NPC Restated Contract") under which NPC agreed to
purchase additional coal from Trail Mountain.

(R. 13). In

addition, the Trail Mountain-NPC Restated Contract does not
contain the three percent limit on sodium oxide in the ash
found in the Trail Mountain-NPC Contract.

(R. 13). Trail

Mountain has been delivering and NPC has been accepting
delivery of coal from Trail Mountain under the Trail
Mountain-NPC Restated Contract.

Beaver Creek and Arco do not

know why NPC apparently changed its prior position that the
Trail Mountain coal was not satisfactory for use at the Reid
Gardner Station and now has contracted to purchase additional
Trail Mountain coal.
Following the settlement of the federal action, Trail
Mountain filed this lawsuit against Beaver Creek and Arco
alleging that the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract was
terminated improperly.

(R. 15). In response, Beaver Creek and

Arco contend that they reasonably demanded assurance of due
performance from Trail Mountain based on NPCfs representations

Copies of the Stipulation of Dismissal and the
Order of Dismissal are appended hereto as Appendices 7 and 8,
respectively. Arco and Beaver Creek request the Court to take
judicial notice of the Stipulation and Order to the extent and
on the basis set forth in note 3, supra.

that Trail Mountain coal contained excessive sodium oxide and
was not satisfactory for use at NPCfs Reid Gardner Station, and
that the failure of Trail Mountain to give any assurance
constituted a repudiation and cancellation of the Beaver
Creek-Trail Mountain Contract as provided in Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-2-609(4).

(R. 119). In addition, Arco and Beaver Creek

have joined NPC as a third-party defendant on the grounds that
NPC is obligated to indemnify Arco and Beaver Creek against any
judgment awarded to Trail Mountain.

(R. 128). The quality of

Trail Mountain coal and whether it was satisfactory for use at
NPC's Reid Gardner Station are pivotal issues in this lawsuit
as well as the federal action.
In the federal action, NPC took the position that the
Trial Mountain coal was not satisfactory for use at the Reid
Gardner Station.12 Since NPC has resumed deliveries of Trail
Mountain coal to its Reid Gardner Station, NPC now apparently
takes a different position and no longer asserts that the Trail
Mountain coal is not satisfactory for use at its Reid Gardner
Station.

Both Trail Mountain and NPC have copies of the

transcripts of the depositions of NPCfs officers and employees
sought by Arco and Beaver Creek.

Those deposition transcripts

obviously contain relevant information concerning the use of

Answer and Counterclaim 11 21 at 8; 11 5 at 30.

_ii_

Trail Mountain coal at NPC's Reid Gardner Station.

In

addition, they may contain dispositive testimony concerning
whether or not Trail Mountain coal was satisfactory for use at
the Reid Gardner Station and NPC's apparent change of position
concerning that subject.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Beaver Creek and Arco are seeking access through
discovery to transcripts of depositions taken in the federal
action by Trail Mountain,of NPC's officers and employees.

NPC

claims that the deposition transcripts are the work product of
its counsel and are therefore only discoverable as provided in
13
Rule 26(b)(3), U.R.C.P.
As the party claiming the
privilege, NPC bears the burden of demonstrating that the
transcripts are work product.

NPC has failed to meet that

burden.
The transcripts of the depositions of NPCfs officers
and employees taken by Trail Mountain are not the work product
of counsel for NPC, and are therefore discoverable without
first satisfying the requirements of Rule 26(b)(3).

The work

product privilege, on which Rule 26(b)(3) is based, is intended
to create a zone of privacy in which an attorney can prepare a
client's case free from the intrusions of opposing counsel.

The text of Rule 26(b)(3) is set forth in
Appendix 9.

_io_

A

deposition transcript is a verbatim record of the testimony
given by a witness in response to questions posed by counsel.
A deposition is not part of an attorney's private preparation
of a client's case.

Clearly, in this matter, the transcripts

of depositions of NPC officers and employees conducted by Trail
Mountain, which has copies of the transcripts, cannot be
considered the private preparation of the case by counsel for
NPC.

Accordingly, the deposition transcripts are not protected

by the work product privilege.
In addition, Rule 32(a), U.R.C.P., explicitly
authorizes the use of depositions taken in one lawsuit in a
subsequent related lawsuit.

This lawsuit involves the same

parties, or their subsidiaries, as were parties to the federal
action.

In addition, this lawsuit is concerned with the same

issue of whether Trail Mountain's coal was satisfactory for use
in NPC's Reid Gardner Station, as was in dispute in the federal
action.

Under Rule 32(a), Arco and Beaver Creek may use the

depositions taken in the federal action as evidence in this
proceeding.

The district court's ruling, however, renders Rule

32(a) meaningless by denying Arco and Beaver Creek access to
the depositions.
The interests of economic judicial administration also
dictate that NPC divulge the testimony of its witnesses
concerning the matters in dispute in this lawsuit.

Numerous

NPC witnesses already have testified about their factual
knowledge of the issues in dispute in this lawsuit.

The time

and expense of redeposing those witnesses can be avoided by
granting Arco and Beaver Creek access to those depositions.
Finally, discovery is intended to allow the parties to
develop facts as completely as possible prior to trial, thereby
narrowing the matters in dispute and encouraging settlement.
Permitting NPC to secrete relevant, objective facts concerning
matters at issue in this lawsuit would be contrary to the
purpose of discovery.
In summary, NPC has not carried its burden of
demonstrating that the deposition transcripts of which Arco and
Beaver Creek seek production are protected by the work product
privilege.

The district court's order must be reversed and an

order entered compelling NPC to produce the requested
deposition transcripts to Arco and Beaver Creek.
ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

The pending action among Trail Mountain, Arco, Beaver
Creek and NPC, out of which this interlocutory appeal arises,
is founded upon the same facts that gave rise to the federal
action.

In order to expedite discovery and to obtain access to

the facts possessed by Trail Mountain and NPC, Arco and Beaver
Creek requested copies of the deposition transcripts taken in

the federal action from Trail Mountain and NPC.

The deposition

transcripts that Arco and Beaver Creek seek obviously contain
relevant information concerning the use of Trail Mountain coal
at NPCfs Reid Gardner Station.

The deposition transcripts also

may contain dispositive testimony concerning whether or not
Trail Mountain coal was satisfactory for use at the Reid
Gardner Station and NPC's apparent change of position
concerning that subject,

NPC's objection to producing the

transcripts of depositions taken by counsel for Trail Mountain
on the grounds that they are the work product of NPCfs counsel
is without merit and must be rejected.
II.

DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS ARE NOT WORK
PRODUCT SUBJECT TO RULE 26(b)(3)

The work product privilege was first adopted by the
United States Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 67 S. Ct. 385 (1947) and was later incorporated into Rule
26(b)(3) of the rules of civil procedure.

Upjohn Co. v. United

States, 449 U.S. 383, 398, 101 S. Ct. 677, 687 (1981).14
The work product privilege is an exception to the broad scope
of discovery permitted under the discovery provisions of the
rules of civil procedure.

The Hickman Court recognized the

work product privilege in order to create a "zone of privacy"

Upjohn addresses Rule 26(b)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P.,
which is identical to Rule 26(b)(3), U.R.C.P.

interference
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T h e Discovery Procedures E s t a b l i s h e d By T h e R u l
Of Civil P r o c e d u r e A r e D e s i g n e d To E n c o u r a g e Fu
D i s c l o s u r e A n d Must B e Construed Broadly

The p r e trial discovery p r o c e d u r e e M ui ...»;,:.

: J1

26 to 37 of the r uJ es of civ:; i procedure d r a m a t i c a l l y

^t.j before tria] w a s naii<wly confined

H i c k m a n , "'2^ J

iieen d e s c r i b e d as "a b a t t l e oi wits rather tl lai i a sear d. -^r
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§ 200]

i /right & ** Mil.ti
•

-Vderai Practice and

< • (Ill 5

In c o n t r a s t , the discovery

5

n e s \i\<v

-..jve i-«en adopted

r

and the federal courts create an integrated mechanism for
narrowing and clarifying the issues in dispute between the
parties and for ascertaining the facts, or information that may
lead to the discovery of the facts, concerning the issues in
dispute.

Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501, 67 S. Ct. at 388-89;

Wright & Miller § 2001 at 13, 16. With the adoption of the
discovery rules "civil trials . . . no longer need be carried
on in the dark."

Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501, 67 S. Ct. at 389;

accord, United States v.,Procter & Gamble Co,, 356 U C S. 677,
682-83, 78 S. Ct. 983; 986-87 (1958).

The present discovery

rules are based on the philosophy that every party to a civil
action is entitled to the discovery of all information that is
relevant or that may lead to the discovery of relevant
information, unless the information is privileged.

Hickman,

329 U.S. at 501, 67 S. Ct. at 389; Wright & Miller § 2001 at 15.
The discovery rules are construed liberally and the
exceptions to discovery are narrowly confined.

Hickman, 329

U.S. at 506-07, 67 S. Ct. at 391-92; Transamerica Title
Insurance Co. v. United Resources, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 346, 471
P.2d 165, 167 (1970); Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429
P.2d 39, 40 (1967); Rule 26(b)(1), U.R.C.P.; Wright & Miller §
2001 at 17. Consequently, the party asserting a privilege, in
this case NPC, bears the burden of demonstrating that the
material sought to be protected is within the scope of the
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S. Ct. at 387-88.

The issue addressed by the Hickman Court

was whether those documents were protected from discovery.
Id. at 505, 67 S. Ct. at 391. The Hickman Court concluded
that the documents were not subject to discovery because the
request was an effort to obtain access to the files and mental
impressions of an attorney.

Id. at 510, 67 S. Ct. at 393. As

such, the request "contravene[d] the public policy underlying
the orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims."

Id., 67

S* Ct. at 393.
The rationale on which the Hickman Court's decision
is founded focuses on the conflict which the Court perceived
between the liberal scope of inquiry mandated by the discovery
rules and the need for privacy essential to an attorney's
preparation of a client's case.
393-94.

Id. at 510-11, 67 S. Ct. at

The need for privacy arises due to the role of an

attorney in the adversary process on which the American system
of litigation is premised.
Proper preparation of a client's case demands
that [an attorney] assemble information, sift
what he considers to be the relevant from the
irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and
plan his strategy without undue and needless
interference. That is the historical and the
necessary way in which lawyers act within the
framework of our system of jurisprudence to
promote justice and to protect their clients'
interests.
Id. at 511; 67 S. Ct. at 393.
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The Hickman Coui I: believed t:l: la t ' f01 ei rig an attorney

to repeat: ox to write out a] 1 that witnesses have told him and
to deliver the account to 1 in s adversary gives rise *-*-)
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67 S. Ctc, at 394
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Procedure A n d A r e Not Part Of The Private
Preparation Of A Client's Case

discovery created
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permitted :

^ present during the

truthfulness; that the proceedings be recorded verbatim by a
court reporter (an independent officer of the court); that the
court reporter certify under oath that the transcript of the
testimony is complete and accurate; that the deponent certify
under oath that the testimony is complete and accurate; and
that the transcript of the testimony be filed with the court.
These procedures establish an open forum in which admissible
facts and information that may lead to the discovery of
admissible facts can be uncovered by attorneys acting as
advocates for their clients.
The procedures established by the rules of civil
procedure are incompatible with the concept of a "zone of
privacy" which the Hickman Court recognized.

Any private

preparation or mental impressions of the client's case
contained in a deposition transcript necessarily have been
disclosed to adversaries during the course of the deposition.
Once a matter is disclosed to an adversary, it cannot be
protected from discovery by the work product privilege.

In re

Grand Jury Subpoena, 622 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1980);
Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 97 F.R.D. 749, 751-52 (E.D.
Pa. 1983).

The work product privilege does not apply to

depositions because the very nature of depositions mandates a
waiver of the privilege.
In this case, any mental impressions of or private
preparation by counsel for NPC that may have been disclosed in

the course n.
already

l
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Liie privilege are

furthered by the application of the work product privilege to
deposition transcripts.

To the contrary because depositions

are one of the tools of discovery created by the rules of civil
procedure there is no basis for and no need to preclude
discovery of deposition transcripts.
III. DENYING ARCO AND BEAVER CREEK ACCESS TO THE
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS IS CONTRARY TO THE PURPOSE
OF DISCOVERY
The basic philosophy on which the discovery rules are
based is that all persons should have access to all relevant
information prior to trial.

Wright & Miller § 2001 at 15.

Discovery of such information helps narrow the factual and
legal issues in dispute, thereby encouraging settlements and
the most efficient use of scarce judicial resources. Hickman,
329 U.S. at 501, 67 S. Ct. at 388-89; Ellis, 429 P.2d at 40;
Wright & Miller § 2001 at 17-18.
In this instance, both Trail Mountain and NPC have
access to the depositions that Arco and Beaver Creek have
requested.

The federal action in which those depositions were

taken and this action have a common pivotal issue:

whether or

not the Trail Mountain coal was satisfactory for use in NPCfs
Reid Gardner Station.

Thus, denying Arco and Beaver Creek

access to these depositions denies Arco and Beaver Creek access
to relevant facts that the other parties possess.

In contrast,

granting Arco and Beaver Creek access to the deposition
transcripts and the facts they contain will narrow and clarify

scope ct
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ARCO AND BfcAVER CREEK ARE ENTITLED TO USE THE
DEPOSITIONS FROM THE FEDERAL ACTION IN THIS CASE
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1°'<^ accord, DeLuryea v.

Winthrop L a b o r a t o r i e s , 69? F 2d

2J2S

22b 2/ :8th , ,r
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(transcript from w o r k e r ¥ s compensation proceeding admi ssible in
later products liability c a s e ) ; Rule v . International
A s s o c i a t i o n of B r i d g e , Structural & Ornamental Iron W o r k e r s ,
"Local Union :± _ _ -

00-0? «

(depositions taker; i,t go\ < r, .men', . ,-^ln^mopt
admissible

m

latr t actiii

1

)
JISL I

iminJL ton case

rouph: 1^ 1 . . nembers) ; Minjren
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Cir. 1971) (Insul-Wood characterized as "bedrock" authority);
Tug Raven v. Trexler, 419 F.2d 536, 542-43 (4th Cir. 1969),
cert, denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970) (transcript from coast
guard proceedings admissible in later personal injury action);
Batelli v Kagen & Gaines Co., 236 F.2d 167, 169 (9th Cir.
1956) (transcript of deposition taken during action on
superseded contract admissible in subsequent proceeding on
superseding contract); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F.
Supp. 1142, 1147-48 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (deposition transcript
from one asbestos action admissible in another asbestos
action); Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics, 515
F. Supp. 834, 847 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (deposition transcript from
one patent action admissible in subsequent patent action); In
re Panoceanic Tankers Corp., 54 F.R.D. 283, 284 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (coast guard hearing transcript admissible in later civil
proceeding); Fullerform Continuous Pipe Corp. v. American Pipe
& Construction Co., 44 F.R.D. 453, 455-56 (D. Ariz. 1968)
(deposition transcript from earlier antitrust action admissible
in subsequent antitrust action involving a new plaintiff); In
re Estate of Eliasen, 105 Idaho 234, 668 P.2d 110, 116 (1983)
(deposition transcript from divorce proceeding admissible in
estate proceeding).

Access to the testimony contained in the

deposition transcripts clearly is essential if the transcripts
are to be useful in preparing the client's case or to be
offered as evidence at trial. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 515, 67 S.

Ct

a 1: 396 ( J a clcs :)i i

J

c ::: i 1 :::i ii i: :i i ig)

11: le j: ::is:i t:i oi l ta kei l by

NPC and adopted by the d istrict court is erroneous because i t
contravenes the provisions of Rule 32 (a) by deny i rig Arco and
Beaver Creek access to the deposition transcripts.
V

THE DONUT SHOPS CASE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER
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against Mace.

Id.

Chick1n Gflore's motion to quash the

subpoena was granted.

Id. at 196.

The Donut Shops case is distinguishable from this
case in two critical respects.

First, the question presented

by Arco and Beaver Creek's motion to compel is whether NPC, a
party, can be compelled to produce the transcripts of
depositions of its officers and employees taken by another
party in another action.

In contrast, the Donut Shops'

attorneys were seeking tp obtain the deposition transcripts by
deposing the attorney for an adverse party.

Donut Shops

wanted more than deposition transcripts, it also wanted to
question the attorney who took the depositions.

Id.

Quite

simply, Donut Shops sought to invade the zone of privacy that
the work product doctrine is intended to protect.
Beaver Creek's request poses no such threat.

Arco and

All Arco and

Beaver Creek seek is the deposition transcripts prepared by the
court reporter.

There is no possibility that the production of

those transcripts will invade the zone of privacy because the
transcripts are merely verbatim recordings of what was said in
an open adversary proceeding.
The district court's reliance on Donut Shops also is
inappropriate because the Donut Shops court expressly stated
that whether the depositions sought in that case "are
obtainable from the parties [to the related proceeding] or the
court reporter that took them is not before this Court for

d e t e r m i ii<11, mi i 11 ""'

Ld.

(Enipl: 1as:i s added)
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discovery.

Rule 32(a) requires that Arco and Beaver Creek have

access to the deposition transcripts requested so that they may
be used in this action.

The case relied upon by the district

court does not support the district court's order.

For these

reasons, Arco and Beaver Creek request that this Court reverse
the district court's order and direct the entry of an order
compelling NPC to produce the deposition transcripts to Arco
and Beaver Creek.
DATED this 18th day of May, 1987.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
John A. Snow
David L. Deisley
50 South Main, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
Thomas F. Linn
P. 0. Box 5300
Denver, Colorado 80217
Telephone: (303) 293-4234

Attorneys tot Ap^eTlants
Arc© Coal Sales'^ Company and
Beaver Creek Coal Company
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APPENDIX 1
COMPLAINT (JURY DEMANDED)

William B. Bohling
Kent T. Anderson
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, a
California corporation,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT
(JURY DEMANDED)

vs.
NEVADA POWER COMPANY, a
Nevada corporation,

iivil No.

t^(-(fjclrl

Defendant.

Plaintiff, Trail Mountain Coal Company, through its
counsel of record, hereby complains of the defendant, Nevada
Power Company, as follows:
I,

DESCRIPTION OF PARTIES; JURISDICTION AND VENUE
!•

Plaintiff, Trail Mountain Coal Company

(hereinafter referred to as "Trail Mountain"), is and was at
all times material hereto, a California corporation with its
principal place of business in Emery County, State of Utah.

Trail Mountain owns and operates the Trail Mountain Coal Mine
located in Emery County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant, Nevada Power Company (hereinafter

referred to as "NPC"), is and was at all times material hereto
a Nevada corporation, with its principal place of business in
the state of Nevada.
3.

NPC is and was at all times material hereto

authorized to do business in the State of Utah and was doing
business on a regular basis within the State of Utah, and this
Court has general in personam jurisdiction over NPC for all
purposes.
4.

The contract on which Trail Mountain's claims are

founded is to be performed by Plaintiff and Defendant in the
State of Utah.
5.

The contract on which Trail Mountain's claims are

founded provides that Plaintiff was to supply and Defendant was
to receive coal in the State of Utah pursuant to such contract.
6.

The contract on which Trail Mountain's claims are

founded provides that it is to be construed and performed in
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah applicable to
agreements made and to be performed in the State of Utah.
7.

NPC has neglected, refused and otherwise failed

to perform in accordance with the provisions of such contract,
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causing injury to Trail Mountain and others in the State of
Utah.
8.

This Court has jurisdiction over all claims set

forth herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 by virtue of the fact
that plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states
and the matter in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs,
exceeds Ten Thousand Dollars (fclO,000.00).

Venue is properly

before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
II.
9.

FACTS

On or about March 1, 1980, NPC and Trail Mountain

entered into a coal sales agreement, a true and correct copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein
by this reference (the "Trail Mountain/NPC Contract").
10.

Pursuant to the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, NPC

agreed to purchase from Trail Mountain specified tonnages of
coal per year for the indefinite term of the contract.

For

calendar years 1983 and thereafter, NPC was required to
purchase 300,000 tons of coal from Trail Mountain, but which
quantity could be reduced to 200,000 tons per year at NPC's
election.

The contract could not be terminated prior to

December 31, 1994, and then only upon two years prior written
notice.

11.

The contract listed, among other specifications

for the coal, a three percent maximum sodium oxide content in
the ash.
12.

Swisher Coal Company, a Utah corporation, and a

wholly owned subsidiary of Atlantic Richfield Company, a
Pennsylvania corporation (hereinafter referred to as MARCO")
and NPC entered into a coal supply agreement dated as of March
1, 1980, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by this reference
(hereinafter referred to as the "ARCO/NPC Contract").
13.

Pursuant to the ARCO/NPC Contract, NPC agreed to

purchase between 225,000 and 275,000 tons of coal per year from
ARCO, which coal was a blend of coal including coal to be
purchased by ARCO from Trail Mountain.
14.

As an integral part of the ARCO/NPC Contract,

Trail Mountain and ARCO entered into a coal supply agreement
dated as of January 3, 1980, a true and correct copy of which
is attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by
this reference (hereinafter referred to as the "Trail
Mountain/ARCO Contract").
15.

Pursuant to the Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract,

ARCO agreed to purchase 120,000 tons of coal per year from
Trail Mountain from January 1, 1980 through December 31, 1994.
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16.

Since the inception of the Trail Mountain/NPC and

Trail Mountain/ARCO Contracts in early 1980, Trail Mountain has
consistently shipped the tonnage of coal required pursuant to
each contract, while the sodium oxide content of the ash in the
Trail Mountain reserves has consistently exceeded three
percent.

At no time prior to late 1983, did NPC complain or

otherwise object to the sodium oxide content of Trail Mountain
Mine coal.

ARCO itself has never objected to the sodium

content of Trail Mountain Mine coal, and ARCO did not
communicate any objection from NPC until May 1984. All such
monthly shipments prior to such dates were accepted and paid
for as full compliance with the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract and
the Trial Mountain/ARCO Contract.
17.

As late as January 1984, officials from NPC told

Trail Mountain personnel that the quality of Trail Mountain
Mine coal was very good and that they were very pleased with
Trail Mountain Mine coal.
18.

Pursuant to the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, NPC

requested that the annual shipments of coal for calendar year
1983 be reduced from 300,000 to 200,000 tons.

Trail Mountain

complied with this request.
19.

On August 13, 1983, NPC requested that Trail

Mountain voluntarily reduce coal shipments by an additional 15%

below the 200,000 ton minimum contained in the contract.

NPC

apparently sought this reduction because abundant river flows
had generated excess hydro-electric power, which power, on
information and belief, is less expensive than coal-generated
power.
20.

Trail Mountain informed NPC that a reduction of

the Trail Mountain Mine's production by an additional 15% would
mean lowering production to an uneconomical operational level,
and expressed to NPC a willingness to reduce its production by
15% if NPC would make certain concessions to Trail Mountain.
NPC refused to make such concessions, but continued to insist
that Trail Mountain reduce its coal shipments by 15% below the
minimum specified in the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract.

No

agreement to alter the contract was reached by Trail Mountain
and NPC.
21.

In late 1983, for the first time, NPC informed

Trail Mountain that the coal from the Trail Mountain Mine
allegedly did not comply with the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract
specifications because of a high sodium oxide content, and on
March 20, 1984, NPC informed Trail Mountain that further
shipments of Trail Mountain Mine coal must be suspended unless
all specifications, including sodium oxide content were met.
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22.

In May 1984, ARCO informed Trail Moutain that NPC

had notified ARCO that the coal from the Trail Mountain Mine
was unsatisfactory to NPC.

ARCO suspended shipments under the

Trail Mountain/ARCO agreement because of NPC's complaints, and
ARCO refused to accept further delivery of Trail Mountain Mine
coal.
23.

Negotiations between Trail Mountain and NPC took

place during the spring and summer of 1984.

Solely as an

accommodation to NPC, and not as an admission of any obligation
pursuant to the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, Trail Mountain
succeeded in locating a coal supplier whose coal could be mixed
with Trail Mountain's coal and achieve a mix with a maximum
sodium oxide content of less than three percent.

Consequently,

Trail Mountain offered to supply a 50/50 mix of Trail Mountain
coal and substitute coal to NPC pursuant to the provisions of
the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, and thus provide coal in
strict conformity with the language of the Trail Mountain/NPC
Contract as originally drafted.
24.

NPC's response to this substitute coal offer was

to permit such substitution and blending of the coal, but not
without imposing additional unreasonable conditions upon Trail
Mountain that are not contained in the Contract, including but
not limited to, requiring "perfect blending", a guaranty that

the blended coal would not adversely affect operations of the
Reid Gardner units, an agreement that Trail Mountain pay $1000
per day for damages to the Reid Gardner units, and a reduction
in the price for the coal..
25.

Subsequently, NPC withdrew the additional

unreasonable conditions to the coal substitution proposal, but
stated that NPC did not accept the substitution proposal and
terminated the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract effective August 1,
1984.
26.

As a direct and proximate result of NPC's breach

and wrongful acts, Trail Mountain will suffer money damages as
follows:
a.

Lost profits from the Trail Mountain/NPC

Contract in an amount of no less than Ten Million One
Hundred Thousand Dollars (tlO,100,000.00);
b.

Lost profits from the Trail Mountain/ARCO

Contract in an amount of no less than Seven Million
Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($7,250,000.00);
c.

The wrongful termination of the Trail

Mountain/NPC and Trail Mountain/ARCO Contracts will
necessitate the closing of the Trail Mountain Mine,
which will result in a loss of sales of Trail Mountain
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coal to third parties causing damages of not less than
Ten Million Dollars ($10,000,000.00);
d.

Damages directly resulting from closing

costs of the mine, idle costs, personnel severance and
other costs, lease obligations and related expenses in
an amount of not less than Nine Million Dollars
($9,000,000.00);
e.

Other incidental and consequential damages

in an amount of not less than Ten Million Dollars
(£10,000,000.00).
27.

If NPC is not immediately required to accept

delivery of and pay for Trail Mountain coal pursuant to the
Trail Mountain/NPC Contract and accept deliveries of coal under
the ARCO/NPC Contract including Trail Mountain coal, the
following irreparable injuries will be incurred by Trail
Mountain, third parties, and the public:
a.
mine.

Trail Mountain will be required to close the

While Trail Mountain would comply with all laws

relating to mine safety procedures, closure of the
mine will probably result in the fresh air equipment
being shut off or removed, temperature changes within
the mine, carbon dioxide collection in the mine unless
fan equipment is continuously operated, and as a

result the mine infrastructure will likely
deteriorate, thus increasing the risk of the mine
becoming a health hazard to the public in and around
the mine area, and increasing the health hazards and
risks associated with any reopening and work to be
done within the mine;
b.

Closing of the mine will likely result in a

decrease or discontinuance of the maintenance of the
mine's infrastructure and all equipment left within
the mine.

Increased moisture will collect in the

mine, and the possibility of infrastructure and
equipment failure will increase, increasing the risk
of safety hazards to persons and the public in and
around the mine area, and increasing the dangers and
risks upon any reopening or work to be performed
within the mine;
c.

Closing of the mine will result in the loss

of the mine's experienced work force, which has a low
injury rate, and valuable training and experience in
the Trail Mountain mine.

This work force is difficult

to replace and cannot be compensated with money
damages, and any reopening of the mine with a new work
force that is less highly trained and less familiar
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with this particular mine will increase the risks and
danger to such work force and others and the public in
and around the mine upon any reopening or work to be
done within the mine.

The mine workers, who will be

laid off during a time of a depressed coal market,
will suffer direct and irreparable injury.
III.

CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT I

28.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 above.
29.

The Trail Mountain/NPC Contract is an

"installment contract" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-2-612.
30.

The monthly coal shipments from Trail Mountain to

NPC substantially conform to all material provisions of the
Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, and the sodium oxide content of
Trail Mountain coal does not substantially impair the value of
any one or all installments of coal shipped to NPC.
31.

By NPC's refusal to accept delivery of Trail

Mountain Mine coal, NPC has breached the Trail Mountain/NPC
Contract and is liable to Trail Mountain for such breach of
contract in an amount to be determined at the trial of this
action.
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COUNT II
32.

Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained

in paragraphs 1 through 31 above.
33.

NPC consistently accepted delivery of Trail

Mountain coal during the first four years of the contract, and
Trail Mountain continued to rely upon such acceptance by NPC
and performed in accordance with the contract.
34.

NPC sought to breach the contract by requiring

Trail Mountain to reduce coal shipments by fifteen percent
below the minimum amount specified in the Contract, apparently
in response to and as a result of NPC's ability to buy
hydro-electric power at cheaper rates.
35.

When Trail Mountain refused to allow NPC to

breach the Contract by reducing coal shipments, NPC utilized
the alleged failure to meet the sodium oxide content criteria
in the Contract as a subterfuge for the improper purpose of
eliminating all shipments of coal under the Trail Mountain/NPC
Contract.
36.

By virtue of the acts complained of herein, NPC

breached the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract and breached its
obligations of fair dealing, reasonableness and good faith
contained explicitly and implicitly in the Contract and as
prescribed by statute, for which breach Trail Mountain is
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entitled to damages from NPC in an amount to be determined at
the trial of this action.
COUNT III
37.

Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations

contained in paragraphs 1 through 36 above.
38.

During the four year course of performance and

course of dealing pursuant to the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract,
Trail Mountain's shipments of coal from the Trail Mountain Mine
and acceptance and payment for such coal by NPC, established
the terms of the Contract and the conformance of Trail Mountain
Mine coal in accordance with the Contract.
39.

The course of performance and course of dealing

between NPC and Trail Mountain with respect to the Contract
modified such contract to eliminate a specific sodium oxide
content requirement for Trail Mountain Mine coal and such
contract provides that Trail Mountain coal is acceptable and in
conformance with such modified contractual provisions.
40.

NPC's refusal to accept Trail Mountain Mine coal

is in breach of the NPC Contract and Trail Mountain is entitled
to damages from NPC in an amount to be determined at the trial
of this action.

COUNT IV
41.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the

allegations in paragraphs 1 through 40 above.
42.

During the four years of performance pursuant to

the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, whereby Trail Mountain
supplied coal to NPC, NPC has waived any requirement that
sodium oxide in the Trail Mountain Mine coal ash be less than
three percent through its acquiesence and acceptance of Trail
Mountain Mine coal as performance pursuant to the Contract.
43.

Trail Mountain relied on the waiver of the sodium

oxide content specifications to the detriment of Trail Mountain
by, among other things, Trail Mountain's failure to seek or
accept alternative contracts or purchasers for Trail Mountain
Mine coal during the course of the four years of performance
pursuant to the NPC Contract? and Trail Mountain's reopening,
maintaining and operating of the mine.
44.

NPC has waived any requirement that sodium oxide

content in Trail Mountain Mine coal not exceed three percent,
and NPC's refusal to accept Trail Mountain Mine coal with a
sodium oxide content in excess of three percent is a breach of
the Contract and Trail Mountain is entitled to damages in an
amount to be determined at trial.
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COUNT V
45.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 44 above.
46.

ARCO has refused to accept shipments of Trail

Mountain coal because NPC informed ARCO that Trail Mountain
Mine coal is unacceptable for use in NPC's Reid Gardner station.
47.

The coal from the Trail Mountain Mine is in

conformance with the ARCO/NPC Contract and the Trail
Mountain/ARCO Contract, and NPC's refusal to accept Trail
Mountain Mine coal through its blending with ARCO coal is a
breach of the ARCO/NPC Contract of which Trail Mountain is an
intended third-party beneficiary.
48.

The terms of the ARCO/NPC Contract that coal

supplied to NPC must be satisfactory for use at the Reid
Gardner station has been contemporaneously interpreted during
the term of that contract and Trail Mountain mine coal has
consistently been and remains satisfactory for use by NPC, and
NPC has waived any requirement, if any, that such coal contain
a sodium oxide content not exceeding three percent.
49.

NPC's refusal to accept coal from the Trail

Mountain Mine to be blended with ARCO coal pursuant to the
ARCO/NPC Contract is a breach of the ARCO/NPC Contract, and

_1 C _

Trail Mountain is entitled to damages in an amount to be
determined at trial.
COUNT VI
50.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 49 above.
51.

The Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract provides that

ARCO will purchase from Trail Mountain a minimum of 120,000
tons of coal per year, and that such coal should be
satisfactory for use in NPC's Reid Gardner plant.
52.

Trail Mountain Mine coal is satisfactory for use

at NPC's Reid Gardner plant.
53.

NPC has, during the first four years of the

ARCO/NPC Contract, accepted Trail Mountain coal for use at
NPC's Reid Gardner plant, and through this course of
performance has established Trail Mountain coal as satisfactory
for use at the Reid Gardner plant.
54.

NPC has wrongfully induced ARCO to refuse to

accept delivery of Trail Mountain coal pursuant to the Trail
Mountain/ARCO Contract.
55.

NPC's interference with and inducement to breach

the Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract has caused direct, incidental
and consequential damages to Trail Mountain, and Trail Mountain
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is entitled to money damages against NPC in an amount to be
determined at trial.
COUNT VII
56.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 55 above.
57.

Paragraph 2.2 of the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract

provides that Trail Mountain has the right to supply substitute
coal to NPC, subject to NPC's approval, which approval will not
be unreasonably withheld.
58.

Trail Mountain offered to NPC a substitute

mixture of its coal and another supplier's coal with an
aggregate sodium oxide content under three percent, not as an
admission of any requirement in the contract that coal have a
sodium oxide content of less than three percent, but solely as
an accommodation to NPC and in an effort to deal in good faith
to meet the demands of NPC.
59.

NPC refused to accept such substitute coal

without conditions that were not set forth or contemplated in
the NPC Contract, and which conditions were unreasonable,
unworkable, burdensome and oppressive.
60.

NPC's refusal to accept substitute coal from

Trail Mountain constitutes a breach of the Trail Mountain/NPC

Contract and Trail Mountain is entitled to damages in an amount
to be determined at trial.
COUNT VIII
61.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 60 above.
62.

NPC's breach of the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract

as set forth in Counts I, II, III, IV, and VII above, and NPC's
breach of the ARCO/NPC Contract in which Trail Mountain is a
third-party beneficiary, and NPC's improper interference with
the Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract, will result in immediate
irreparable damages to Trail Mountain, third parties and the
public, by increasing the risks and dangers of the Trail
Mountain Mine by increasing the deterioration of the
infra-structure and equipment in such mine, and increasing
health and safety dangers on the occasion of the mine's
reopening, and will cause irreparable injury due to the loss of
an experienced and well-trained work force familiar with the
mine, and will increase the risk to the mine workers upon a
reopening of the mine with different personnel.

The mine

employees will also suffer immediate and direct irreparable
injury.
63.

Trail Mountain is entitled to a preliminary and

permanent injunction requiring NPC to commence immediately and
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continue purchasing Trail Mountain coal in accordance with the
Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, and to require NPC to inform
immediately and instruct ARCO to accept delivery and pay for
Trail Mountain coal pursuant to the Trail Mountain/ARCO
Contract and the ARCO/NPC Contract.
WHEREFORE, Trail Mountain prays for judgment against
NPC as follows:
A.

For a preliminary and permanent injunction

requiring NPC to commence immediately and continue acceptance
of and make payment for Trail Mountain coal in accordance with
the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, and to require NPC to
immediately inform and instruct ARCO to accept delivery and pay
for Trail Mountain coal pursuant to the Trail Mountain/ARCO
Contract and for NPC to accept delivery and pay for Trail
Mountain coal as blended under the ARCO/NPC Contract.
B.

For a money judgment against NPC in an amount of

not less than Forty-six Million Two Hundred Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($46,250,000.00).
C.

For interest on the amount of all damages at the

legal rate from the date of NPC's suspension of acceptance of
Trail Mountain coal through judgment and at the judgment rate
from the date of judgment until paid.

D.

For all costs of this action.

E.

For such other and further relief as the Court

deems just and equitable.
DATED this

STATE OF KENTUCKY
COUNTY OF fayeffa^

C>

day of August, 1984.

)
:
)

ss.

I, John Dragos, being first duly sworn, do hereby
verify and certify that I am an authorized agent of Trail
Mountain Coal Company, and I have read the foregoing Complaint
and the matters stated therein are true and correct to the best
of my knowledge, information and belief.
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ds S>C6
DATED this
S>'6

day of August, 1984.

JCpri Dragos ^-^
Subscribed and sworn to before me this O f /J day of
August, 1984.

OCui

NOTARY PUBLIC '
Residing at: iu^ c^rhy^

My Commission Expires:

/6'J-/~W
Plaintiff's Address:
1200 First Security Plaza
Lexington, Kentucky 40507

f

((J^HJIJLL^

APPENDIX 2
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM OF NEVADA POWER COMPANY

;

C-i.L.I

Elliott Lee Pratt (A2641)
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS & CAHOON
Attorneys for Defendant
77 West Second South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-2516
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAU
CENTRAL DIVISION
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, a
California corporation,

I ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
OF NEVADA POWER COMPANY

Plaintiff,

vs.
NEVADA POWER COMPANY, a
Nevada corporation,
Defendant.

i Civil No. C-84-0686A
i Chief Judge Aldon J. Anderson

COMES NOW Nevada Power Company

and moves

to dismiss the I

Complaint for its failure to state a claim against this defendant I
upon which

relief can be granted, upon

the grounds

that

the |

Complaint has failed to join Swisher Coal Company as an indispensable party, and upon the following specific grounds:
(a)

Trail Mountain Coal Company has recently been acquired I

by Diamond Shamrock Chemical Company, who is the real party in j
interest, and for the further reason that the operation of the ,
mine and the ownership of the mine in question is under the con- .
trol and direction of Diamond Shamrock Coal Company who, under the j
provisions of Rule 17(a), should be the real party in interest in !
this action.

I

(b)
party

Under Count Vr Trail Mountain seeks damages as a third-

beneficiary

under

a

Nevada

Power

Company/Swisher

Coal

Company Contractr Exhibit B, when under the law and under the provisions of the applicable contracts, Exhibits A, B, & C, Trail
Mountain's claim, if anyr is against Swisher Coal Company, requiring Swisher as an indispensable party in this action.
(c)

The Complaint is seeking specific performance under both

a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction and fails to
state relief justifying injunctive relief in the following particulars:
(i)

There is no allegation of an inadequate remedy at

law, but to the contrary, the Complaint claims ascertainable
damages for breach of contract.
(ii)

There are no allegations of an immediate irrepar-

able injury.

Instead, the claim

is only for future and

clearly speculative events, rather than immediate causal factors.
(iii)

There are no allegations showing the probability

of success on the merits.
(iv)

The public policy and irreparable injury allega-

tions of paragraphs 27 and 62 are either immaterial to the
injunction proceeding

or are

clearly

eliminated

by Trail

Mountain1s compliance with existing mining statutes and regulations

set

forth

under

30 C.P.R.

75.325 and 30 C.F.R. 75.330.

T>E, PRATT.
s ft CAHOON
RNEYS AT LAW
ERICAN SAVINGS
PLAZA
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75.1171-1, 75.1171-3,

(v)

There are no allegations that the relative hard-

ship to the defendant, notwithstanding the bond, is less than
on the plaintiff.
(d)

The action

waiver

of quality

U.C.A.

70A-2-612

claiming

requirements
and

further

modification
is barred
by

Section

of

the

contract

by

the

provisions

13

of

the

and
of

contract,

Exhibit A to the Complaint, which provides inter alia, that the
failure of either party to insist upon strict performance shall
not be construed as a waiver of such provisions, but such provisions shall continue in full force and effect.
By way of further answer

to the Complaint,

this

defendant

admits, denies and alleges as follows in response to the specific
paragraphs set forth in the Complaint.

I.
DESCRIPTION OF PARTIES; JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Denies the allegations of paragraph

1, but admits that

Trail Mountain Coal Company is a California corporation qualified
to do business
that

in the State of Utah; and alleges

the Diamond

Shamrock

Coal Company

is the operator

Trail Mountain Coal mine.

E. P R A T T .
& CAHOON
IEYS AT LAW

affirmatively

2.

Admits the allegations of paragraph 2.

3.

Admits the allegations of paragraph 3.

4.

Admits the allegations of paragraph 4.

5.

Admits the allegations of paragraph 5.

6.

Admits the allegations of paragraph 6.

of the

7.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 7.

8.

Admits the allegations of paragraph 8.

II.
FACTS
9.

Admits

plaintiff
which

that on or about March

entered

int^ a Coal

is attached

as Exhibit

1, 1980, defendant and

Sales Agreement,
A, but alleges

a true

further

copy of

that

said

Agreement was modified by an Amendment thereto also dated March 1,
1980, which has not been attached to the Exhibit A, and denies all
other allegations of paragraph 9.
10.
agreed

Admits

that

to purchase

Trail

Mountain

specified

agreed

to sell

and Nevada

tonnages of coal per year

for the

term of the contract; admits that for the year 1983 and subsequent
years that under certain conditions the quantity could be reduced
to 200,000 tons per year at the election

of NPC; alleges

that

under Section 3 of the Contract, the quantities were reduced to
200,000 tons and to 100,000 tons in particular years; and denies
all other allegations of paragraph 10. Defendant alleges affirmatively that the coal had to meet certain specific sodium requirements

and certain

specific ash fusion temperature

requirements,

and that Nevada Power had the right under the contract to suspend
further

delivery

requirements
substance
cause.
DE. P R A T T .
& CAHOON
NEYS AT L A W
RICAN SAVINGS
PLAZA

and purchase

of coal which

on two consecutive

provides

Absent

that

deliveries.

the contract

justifiable

could

did not meet
Said
be

such

provision in

terminated

for

cause, the term of the contract was

M

indefinite, but could be terminated for other than cause at any
time

after
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prior to execution of the Trail Mountain-Nevada Power Coal Sale
Agreement that the coal would meet the maximum of 3 percent sodium
content

in its ash and said term was thereupon agreed

placed in the contract.

to and

Trail Mountain, as it has alleged in

paragraph 16, continually shipped coal having in excess of said
maximum percentage of 3 percent sodium, knowing that the coal did
not meet 3 percent sodium requirement, and at no time informed
Nevada Power that said coal did not meet said requirement.

From

time to time the Trail Mountain coal had various deficiencies in
it which caused operating problems and which deficiencies were
contrary to the quality specifications set forth in the contract
and Nevada Power, in August, 1981, found that at- ipast- nn* shipment of Trail Mountain Coal did not meet the 3 percent maximum
sodium

percentage

requirement

and so informed

Trail

Mountain.

However, Trail Mountain, at that time and throughout the contract,
continued to assure Nevada Power that its coal did meet all the
requirments under the contract.

In late 1983 Nevada Power had
of "slagging*1

in its

boilers and questioned ARCO concerning its coal supply.

There-

increasingly

excessive shutdowns because

after in order to attempt to isolate the cause of the increasing
slagging, Nevada Power undertook tests in early March, 1984, of
the five consecutive shipments made by Trail Mountain in January,
February, and March, 1984.

Said tests showed that all five train

loads exceeded the 3 percent maximum sodium oxide ash content.
Immediately upon learning for the first time that the Trail Mountain coal was consistently higher than the maximum sodium content
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20.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 20, and alleges that

Trail Mountain responded to the letter suggesting the reduction by
requesting

an unreasonable

500,000 tons of coal.

increase

of the contract

minimum

to

Upon receipt of this request, Nevada Power

simply did not pursue the matter further and left it up to Trail
Mountain whether or not Trail Mountain would voluntarily

reduce

its sale by 15 percent and Trail Mountain elected not to do so.
21.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 21 as alleged in the

Complaint and affirmatively alleges and admits that there had been
several

complaints

throughout

the years concerning

which complaints were both in writing and oral.
approximately

coal

quality

Admits

that in

1983 Nevada Power informed Trail Mountain that its

coal might not comply with the sodium oxide specification; admits
that on March 20, 1984, Nevada Power
letter

that

further

shipments

of

informed Trail Mountain by

such

coal

would

be

suspended

unless and until the sodium oxide specification was met.
dant

alleges that Trail Mountain knew prior

Defen-

to negotiating

contract that its coal did not comply with the 3 percent
oxide specification and continually maintained that

the

sodium

its coal was

meeting all contract specifications, even though there was a continuous objection to the quality of the Trail Mountain
various reasons.

coal for

Defendant further alleges that it was not until

the testing of the specific Trail Mountain train loads delivered
during January, February, and March of 1984 that it was determined
that Trail Mountain coal was causing the slagging and shutdown of
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meet the sodium

test

and

chases would be suspended

informed

plaintiff that

the

coal pur-

in accordance with the contract provi-

sions until the contract specifications could be met.

Plaintiff

thereupon confirmed through its own test that its coal would not
meet the specification.

No effort was made by plaintiff to remedy

the defective coal -and on April 27, 1984, plaintiff was further
notified by letter that unless Trail Mountain furnished evidence
that the coal mixture would meet the quality specifications of the
agreement by August 1, 1984, that Nevada Power would consider the
agreement to be cancelled.

Said notice was a reasonable

and in accordance with Section 4.3 of the agreement

notice

between the

parties.
26.

Denies

the

allegations

of

paragraph

26

and

alleges

affirmatively that all of the alleged money damages are speculative and without substance and alleges further that the plaintiff
has failed and refused to mitigate any alleged losses by refusing
to correct the deficient coal supply and by failing and refusing
to find other purchasers for said coal.

Defendant

alleges that

the claimed damages are not the result of any breach of contract,
but are purely and simply imaginative and without foundation.
27.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 27, and alleges that

the claimed "irreparable injuries" are not irreparable, that the
alleged difficulties are properly resolved and eliminated

if the

plaintiff complies with the applicable Federal Coal Regulations,
including,

but

not

75.1171-1,

75.1171-3,

limited
30

to

C.F.R.

-10-

the

provisions

75.325

and

30

of

30

C.F.R.

C.F.R.
75.330.
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in excess of $64,000 per day per boilerf added repair and maintenance costs and a reduction in plant efficiency.
31.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 31 and alleges that

the plaintiff, by failing and refusing to comply with the contract
specifications after reasonable and proper notice to the plaintiff
to so comply, materially breached the contract by refusing to furnish

coal

entitling

in accordance
the defendant

with

the contract

to terminate

specifications, thus

the contract

in accordance

with paragraph 4.3.

Count II
32.

Defendant

incorporates herein and realleges the admis-

sions, denials and allegations contained in its answers 1 through
31 above.
33.
at such

Denies the allegations of paragraph 33 and alleges that
time as the defendant

Trail Mountain coal

first was

able

to segregate

the

from the other seven suppliers of coal and

determine through testing that the Trail Mountain coal was deficient in its sodium oxide requirement, defendant immediately notified plaintiff of such deficiency and requested that the plaintiff
comply with the terms of the contract, all as is required and permitted under the terms of the contract; and alleges further that
from

the

inception

of

the

contract

in

1980,

Trail

Mountain,

itself, knew of but failed to inform defendant of the fact that
its coal did not meet this contract specification.
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Defendant
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> M'ined

in its answer

under para-

1 through 36 above,
Denies Lile allegations nl paragraph

b o t n uy i! he t e r m s of
L PRATT,

incorporates herein and realleges the allega-

IIIUM IIIIII I IMI II III I I
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"IH,, and alleges that

unit

r i 1 in,

MM

provi-

sions of paragraph 13 of the Nevada Power/Trail Mountain Contract,
plaintiff's claim for contract modification is barred.
39.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 39.

40.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 40, and alleges that

Nevada Power at no time refused to accept any Trail Mountain coal
that

complied

with

the contract

requirements, and

alleges

that

Trail Mountain failed and refused to take any reasonable steps to
correct its deficient coal and instead suggested impossible conditions

with

trucks.

its

alleged

offer

to

combine

coal

Defendant further alleges that plaintiff

by

alternating

failed to take

any of the available steps which were available which would have
eliminated the problem, thus mitigating any losses completely.

Count IV
41.

Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference

the allegations, admissions and denials set forth

in its answer

under paragraphs 1 through 40 above*
42.
even

if

Denies the allegations of paragraph 42, and alleges that
there

had

been

acquiescence

and

acceptance,

which

is

denied by defendant, but which has been alleged by plaintiff, said
acquiescence and acceptance does not modify the contract and does
not lessen or eliminate any of the terms of the contract
specifically provided

for under the Uniform Commercial

as is

Code and

under paragraph 13 of the contract.
43.
Trail

Denies the allegations of paragraph 43, and alleges that

Mountain

knew

at

all

times
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with ARCO coal if such coal met the Trail Mountain/Nevada Power
quality specifications; and any claim for breach of contract or
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resulting

between

the

therefrom

plaintiff

and

is only
ARCO,

and

applicable
should

to the

contract

therefore

be

dis-

missed.

Count VI
50.

Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference

the allegations, admissions and denials contained

in its answer

under paragraphs 1 through 49 above.
51.

Admits

the allegations

of paragraph

51

insofar

relates to the Coal Supply Agreement, Exhibit C, attached
Complaint, but alleges that said contract

as it
to the

speaks for itself and

alleges further that in substance the contract has been assigned
by the Fetterolf Group, Inc.
52.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 52.

53.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 53, and alleges fur-

ther that under the Uniform Commercial Code of Utah and under the
provisions of the contract, the Trail Mountain Coal Agreement has
not been amended, nor have the quality

requirements

in any way

been modified or reduced from those set forth in the original contract.
54.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 54.

55.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 55, and alleges that

Nevada Power has the right under its contract to not accept coal
which does not meet the specification

-16-

requirements

set forth in

the Trail Mountain/Nevada
percent

Power Contract,

i.e., a maximum

sodium oxide and a minimum of 2,200 degrees

of 3

Fahrenheit

ash fusion temperature.

Count VII
56.

Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference

the allegations, admissions and denials contained

in its answer

under paragraphs 1 through 55 above.
57.

Admits that paragraph 2.2 of the contract provides that

Trail Mountain may provide substitute coal to NPC subject to NPC's
approval, which approval will not be unreasonably

withheld, but

alleges that the said paragraph 2.2 also provides that such substitute coal shall be subject to all other terms and conditions of
this agreement; and that Trail Mountain, in proposing to supply a
mix of its coal and another supplier's coal, failed and refused to
agree that said coal should comply with the quality specifications
governing sodium oxide content and ash fusion temperatures, which
provisions are some of the "other terms and conditions of this
agreement"; and that defendant has not unreasonably withheld any
approval because the plaintiff has not offered to supply such coal
in accordance with the contract conditions.
58.
of

Admits that Trail Mountain offered a substitute mixture

its coal

and

another

supplier's

coal, but denies

all other

allegations of paragraph 58, and specifically denies that such an
offer was made in good faith because the plaintiff always knew its
coal could not comply with the specification and also refused to

have said coal comply with the contract specifications.

Defendant

further alleges that said offer to substitute coal was made within
just a few days prior to the termination date set by the defendant
as August 1, 1984, without any attempt to satisfy defendant that
said coal could meet the specifications; and that prior thereto in
April,

1984, plaintiff's

own

testing

laboratory

had

determined

that plaintifffs coal could not meet the contract specifications.
59.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 59 and alleges that

the only condition indicated by the defendant was that the coal
would have to meet the contract requirements, and that such a condition was reasonable

and

in accordance with

the

contract, was

workable since plaintiff could have properly mixed such coal with
proper blending to come up with a substitute coal, was not burdensome in that the relative cost to be employed by the plaintiff to
accomplish a coal meeting specification was readily available to
the plaintiff, and that said condition was in no way oppressive,
in that
the

the plaintiff

steps

to make

could

easily

and

the coal

comply

with

readily

have

undertaken

the specification, but

refused to do so.
60.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 60 and alleges fur-

ther that defendant has at all times been ready, willing and able
to continue the contract performance with the plaintiff, had the
plaintiff furnished coal to meet the contract specifications, and
alleges

further

that

Trail

Mountain

has

failed

and

refused

to

mitigate its claimed damages, either by effectively blending the
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coal or by seeking other purchasers, both of which remedies have
been and are readily available.

Count VIII
61.

Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference

the allegations, admissions and denials hereinabove set forth in
its answer under paragraphs 1 through 60 above.
62.
these

Denies the allegations of paragraph 62, and alleges that

allegations

have

been

specifically

and

generally

denied

heretofore and to the extent that they have not, defendant herein
denies specifically

and generally

all allegations of this para-

graph 62.
63.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 63, and alleges that

the plaintiff has neither alleged a cause of action for a preliminary or a permanent injunction, has admitted that it breached the
contract, and has so breached since the inception of the contract
by refusing to furnish coal meeting the contract specification.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE CONCERNING BREACH OF CONTRACT

1.

Nevada Power constructed the Reid-Gardner Plant in four

different generating boilers, the order of construction and placing said boilers on line for generation was as follows:

PRATT,
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No. 1 boiler:

Placed on line June 30, 1965;

No. 2 boiler:

Placed on line June 1, 1968;

No. 3 boiler:

Placed on line May 30, 1976; and

No. 4 boiler:

Placed on line July 26, 1983.

Boilers 1, 2, and 3 have particular specifications requiring that
coal used in the firing of said boilers would have a maximum of 3
percent sodium oxide in the ash and would require a minimum ash
fusion temperature of 2,200 degrees Fahrenheit, along with other
specific

requirements.

The

Trail

Mountain

coal

specifically for use in boilers 1, 2, and 3.

was

purchased

Separate coal con-

tracts were entered into with other suppliers to furnish coal for
Boiler Unit No. 4.

Nevada Power is unable to use coal in Units 1,

2, and 3 which does not meet the above specifications.
2.

Plaintiff was informed, during negotiations and prior to

execution of the contract of the fact, that Nevada Power's Reid
Gardner Generating Plants, boilers 1, 2, and 3 were constructed in
such a way that they could only be operated with coal having 3
percent or less sodium oxide content

in the ash and having

fusion minimum temperatures of 2,200 degrees Fahrenheit.

ash

Plain-

tiff represented to defendant in its written proposal to defendant
prior to execution of the coal sales that its coal from the Trail
Mountain

mine

met

those

specifications,

representations, defendant entered

and

based

upon

these

into the Coal Sale Agreement,

Exhibit A, attached to the Complaint, in which said specifications
were included.
3.

Defendant alleges upon information and belief that dur-

ing the contract

negotiation plaintiff

knew

its coal

would

not

meet the specification, and defendant further alleges that at the
execution of the said contract and continuing
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thereafter

to the

present timer plaintiff Trail Mountain knew that its coal did not
meet the contract specifications concerning

sodium oxide maximum

percentages and ash fusion minimum temperatures.
4.

During performance of the contract, the defendant

had

continuous difficulty in maintaining its boilers, which difficulty
was caused by the Trail Mountain coal, but which, through regular
ASTM testing, and notwithstanding

complaints

to Trail

Mountain,

defendant was unable to determine the exact cause for the slagging
and continued operational problems in the boilers.

Notwithstand-

ing these complaints, the plaintiff continued to assure defendant
that the coal met all contract specification requirements.
5.

In December,

1983, defendant

encountered

more

serious

and continuous outages than had occurred over the past years in
its boiler operations, and conducted a thorough investigation and
independent testing program to attempt to isolate the coal causing
the problem and to isolate the problem.

Said testing involved the

samples from five consecutive shipments taken from the Trail Mountain mine during the months of January, February and one sample in
early March of 1984.
1984, that

Trail

From these tests it was concluded in March,

Mountain

coal was

substantially

exceeding

the

sodium oxide maximum requirement of 3 percent and that this deficiency was jeopardizing the operation of boilers 1, 2, and 3 in
the Reid-Gardner plant.
6.

On March 19, 1984, immediately after making such deter-

mination, defendant, at a conference with Trail Mountain representatives, and again on March
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20, 1984, by a letter

attached

as

Exhibit 1 , suspended further Trail Mountain deliveries of coal
until it was proven that Trail Mountain coal met the specifications.
7.

Thereafter, on April 16, 1984, Trail Mountain conducted

its own independent testing of the coal and said tests showed that
the Trail Mountain .coal could not meet the sodium oxide specifications under the contract.
8.

On April 27, 1984, after receiving the Trail Mountain

test and because of the immediate urgency in keeping the plant in
operation, Nevada Power gave written notice, in accordance with
paragraph

4.3 of the contract, that Trail Mountain had until

August 1, 1984, to show that the coal it was selling would meet
the specification.
9.

See Exhibit 2 attached.

On July 18, 1984, Trail Mountain offered to mix its coal

with the higher grade of coal to be obtained from Tower Resources,
another coal supplier in the area which had a low sodium content,
and proposed to do this by simply alternating truck loads from the
Trail Mountain mine and from the Tower Resources mine.

Such a

proposal was obviously unworkable for many reasons and did not
show or attempt to show that the coal would meet the specification, and on July 23, 1984, Nevada Power responded to the offer
requesting evidence that the coal would meet the specifications,
and at the same time questioned the practicality of such a mixing
process using alternate truck loads.

At all times since December

1983, defendant has consistently informed plaintiff that the only
requirement it has is that the coal be supplied in accordance with
DE. P R A T T .
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the quality terms of the contract.

However, the plaintiff, at the

same time, by its July 30, 1984 letter, refused to undertake any
more efforts to furnish coal in accordance with the contract or to
furnish any proof that its coal would meet the specification, but
to the contrary, maintained that the contract had now been modified by

its consistent

furnishing

of subspecification

materials

over the past years, and the defendant thereafter, without further
effort

to mitigate

its losses, to satisfy the contract

require-

ments, commenced this lawsuit.
10.

Paragraph 4.3 of the contract provides that Nevada Power

shall have the right to suspend further shipments of coal if two
consecutive shipments of coal do not meet the quality specifications of paragraph 4.1, i.e., the 3 percent maximum sodium oxide
ash content and the 2,200 minimum ash fusion temperature requirements.
11.

That Article 13 of the contract provides that the fail-

ure of either party to insist in any one or more instances upon
strict performance of any of the provisions of the agreement or
take advantage of any of its rights hereunder shall not contitute
a waiver of any such provisions or the relinquishment of any such
rights,
effect

and

such

provisions

shall

continue

for the term of the agreement.

in

full

force

and

By this paragraph, the

plaintiff has agreed that, notwithstanding

its delivery of sub-

specification coal, it nevertheless cannot modify

the terms and

conditions of the contract concerning quality of the coal, and the
defendant by the same provisions and under the same circumstances,

has

the

effect.
tract

right

to

continue

such

provisions

in

full

force

and

The defendant continued in effect the coal quality con-

provisions,

and

the

plaintiff

materially

breached

those

quality provisions by refusing to furnish the assurance that its
coal would meet the specifications.
12.

Nevada Power cannot use coal in Units 1, 2, and 3 that

does not meet the sodium and ash fusion specifications.

Any such

use results in slagging and in the ultimate shutdown of the boiler
involved for a period of time while the boiler cools, while it is
cleaned,

and

while

it gets

back

into operation,

all

of

which

causes substantial extra cost, both in the remedying of the problem and in the necessary purchase of supplemental power to be used
in

lieu

of

that

which

otherwise

would

be

generated

by

such

boiler.
13.

Section 70A-2-209(5), U.C.A., provides in substance that

a party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of
the

contract

may

retract

the waiver

by reasonable

notification

that strict performance will be required of any term which has
been waived, unless the retraction would be unjust

in view of a

material change of position in reliance on the waiver.

Thus, it

is the defendant's position that even if there was any type of
waiver as is alleged, the waiver has been retracted by an express
and reasonable notice to Trail Mountain so indicating; and that at
the same time there has been no change in position, either alleged
or claimed by plaintiff in reliance on the waiver.
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14.

The

claims

of

therefore of no avail

waiver

and

of

to the plaintiff

breach

of

contract

and should

are

be dismissed

with prejudice.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE CONCERNING
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
15.

As an affirmative defense to the claim

relief, defendant

realleges

paragraphs

1 through

for
14

injunctive
under

the

affirmative defense to plaintiff's claim for breach of contract.
16.

Nevada

Power

power to Clark County
220,000 consumers
generating

is a public

utility

furnishing

electric

and portions of Nye County, Nevada, with

taking

service

from Nevada Power.

capacity of Nevada Power

The

total

is 1600 megawatts, and

the

actual connected base load to Nevada Power necessary to serve its
customers is approximately 1300 megawatts.

The Reid-Gardner Plant

generating units 1, 2, and 3, supply 330 megawatts of power dedicated to the base load requirements, which power serves a portion
of Las Vegas, Nevada.
megawatts.

Reid-Gardner

boiler No. 4 generates

250

The consumers of Nevada Power include the large casi-

nos, such as the MGM Hotel, which requires 45 megawatts, about the
equivalent of the power requirements of the City of St.

George,

Utah.
17.

All of the power of the Reid-Gardner plant is necessary

for the complete service to Nevada Power's customers, and in the
event that one of the boilers is shut down for a 24-hour period,
the power must be purchased from some other source, and the cost
.PRATT.
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of purchase power is approximately $128,000 per day per boiler, or

$64,000 per day per boiler, in excess cost over and above the normal operating cost for said boiler for said period of time.
18.

Section 4.2 of the Nevada Power/Trail Mountain Contract

requires that the buyer shall test each train load by ASTM standards.

Said testingf however, does not include testing for sodium

oxide content, nor ash fusion minimum temperatures.

The A.S.T.M.

tests were carried on by Nevada Power for each of the train loads
of the Trail Mountain coal as it left the mine yard.

Testing for

sodium and ash fusion cannot be accomplished at the mine yardf but
can only be performed

in a technical

time

procedure at the Nevada delivery point.

consuming

laboratory

Under the contract Nevada

took title at the Acco siding and therefore

could

not

test

for

sodium and ash fusion until after it had received delivery at its
plant.

Nevada Power

representation

that

thus had
the

coal

to rely
met

upon

the

the Trail

sodium

and

Mountain

ash

fusion

requirement.
19.

Excessive sodium oxide ash content results in "slagging"

of a boiler and said

slagging

eventually

results

in a loss of

efficiency and eventually in a shutdown of that particular boiler,
resulting

in a loss in excess of $64,000 a day during

the time

that the boiler has to cool, has to be cleaned, and thereafter put
back on the line in service.
20.

The allegations of the Complaint are couched in terms of

futuristic and speculative loss of profits or the occurrence of
damages apparently predicated

over the full

extending on into the indefinite future.
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life of

a contract

The allegations of the

Complaint claim clearly that there are ascertainable contract damages in the event that Nevada Power breached the contract.
21.

Plaintiff's claim based upon irreparable injury shows no

present danger to its existence or to the public and

therefore

fails

immediate

as

an

allegation

irreparable harm.

of

the

essential

element

of

Said allegation fails to show that there is no

adequate legal remedy.'
22.
ties,

In the balancing of relative hardships between the par-

there

is no allegation

or claim

that

the plaintiff

immediately suffer any non-compensable hardship.

will

The defendant,

on the other hand, if it is forced to accept said coal which does
not meet the specification requirements, will be forced to close
its boilers and suffer for each boiler for each shutdown day the
cost of purchased power over and above the cost of operating the
boiler in an amount of $64,000; and that the relative hardships
are fairly and substantially balanced in favor of the defendant,
rather than in favor of the plaintiff.
23.

The

policy

considerations

concerning

mine

safety

or

affecting the public interest are caused, if at all, not by the
defendant terminating the contract, but by the plaintiff's failure
to

comply

with

the

various

mandatory

safety

requirements

of

Chapter 30 of the C.F.R., which governs the methods and procedures
by which

a mine

is completely

continued in partial operation.

shutdown, partially

shutdown, or

The speculative hardships to the

public do not exist, but for the improper or even negligent fail-
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ure of the plaintiff to comply with the procedures to be followed
under the above regulations.
24.

The final defect in plaintiff's claim in equity is the

plaintiff's
hands.

failure to come

into an equitable

court

with

clean

The plaintiff entered into this contract after represent-

ing that its coal would meet the specifications, but nevertheless!
knowing that the coal did not mee*- the specifications and continuing

to maintain

that

the coal met

the specifications

when, in

fact, the coal did not.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO THE CLAIM RELATIVE
TO THE ARCO-TRAIL MOUNTAIN CONTRACT
25.

The

ARCO-Trail

Mountain

contract

Mountain shall sell and ARCO shall purchase
per year.

provides

that

Trail

120,000 tons of coal

The plaintiff, in asking for an injunction "to require

Nevada Power

to inform

immediately

and

instruct

ARCO

to accept

delivery and pay for Trail Mountain coal . . ." requires Nevada
Power to require specific performance by ARCO of its contract with
Trail Mountain, notwithstanding that ARCO is not a party to this
proceeding and will have its rights and liabilities determined by
Nevada Power without proper representation.

WHEREFORE, defendant prays that the Complaint and each of its
counts be dismissed with prejudice, defendant be awarded its costs
incurred herein and be allowed such other relief as may be equitable under the circumstances.

COUNTERCLAIM
By way of counterclaim of Nevada Power Company against Trail
Mountain Coal Company, Nevada Power alleges as follows:

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

Nevada Power Company is a public utility with its prin-

cipal place of business at Las Vegas, Nevada, serving

electric

power to approximately 220r000 consumers and consumer connections
in Clark County and in Nye County, Nevada, with the principal area
of service at Las Vegas, Nevada.

Nevada Power is authorized to do

business in the State of Utah.
2.

Trail Mountain Coal Company is a California corporation

doing business in Utah, and defendant is informed and thus alleges
that the said plaintiff

is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Shamrock

Diamond Chemical Company.
3.

The defendant, Nevada Power Company, and the plaintiff,

Trail Mountain Coal Company, entered into a Coal Sales Agreement
on or about March

1, 1980, a copy of which

Complaint

herein

on

file

as

Exhibit

incorporated herein by reference.

A, and

is attached
which

to the

contract

is

On or about March 1, 1980, the

parties also entered into a letter agreement which supplements the
aforesaid Coal Sales Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto
as Exhibit 3, and is incorporated herein by reference.
4.

The defendant realleges paragraphs 1 through 25 in the

affirmative defenses.

5.

By reason

Coal Sales contract

of

the plaintiff's

by failing

breach

and refusing

of

the

aforesaid

to furnish

coal in

accordance with the contract specifications, Nevada Power Company
has been damaged

by reason of its shutdown

of elements

in the

Reid-Gardner Plant by an amount in excess of $64,000 per day for
those days shutdown as a result of the failure of Trail Mountain
to

furnish

the

specified

coal

and

an

undetermined

amount

for

repairs to the boilers; and that defendant will be further damaged
in an amount yet to be determined representing the difference in
price that defendant may have to pay between the Trail Mountain
price and a substitute coal supplier.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

Defendant

Nevada

Power

Company

realleges

paragraphs 1

through 5 in the First Cause of Action.
2.

Defendant

seeks

a declaratory

judgment

of

this

court

determining' that the Coal Sales Agreement between the parties has
been properly cancelled and of no legal effect Section 57 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and as implemented by 28 U.S.C.,
Section 2201.
WHEREFORE, defendant prays for a judgment in the amount of no
less than $64,000 per day for every day that a unit of the ReidGardner Plant

is idle as a result of plaintiff's
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breach of the

contract, and a judgment determining that the Coal Sales Agreement
of March 1, 1980, has been properly terminated.
DATED this 7th day of September, 1984.
CLYDE^RSA^, GIBBS &

lott Lee Pratt
Attorneys for Defendant
Nevada Power Company
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bcc:

B. Biersdor
J . Smith

NEVADA POWER COMPANY

J A M E S H. Z O R N E S
Vice P r e s i d e n t
G e n e r a t i o n Engineering.
Construction. Operations

March 2 0 , 1984

Diamond Shamrock Corporation
1200 First Security Plaza
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
Attention:

Mr. John Dragos
Executive Vice President

Dear Mr. Dragos:
I am attaching the sodium oxide analysis of the coal shipped to us from
Trail Mountain since the first of the year. It is readily apparent
that we have an on-going problem with the coal not meeting the sodium
oxide specification in the contract.
This has caused us considerable problems with our units and several
times forced us to shut the units down.
Because of this I must invoke Section A.3 of our contract and suspend
further shipments until such time as it can be proven that the Trail
Mountain coal will meet all specifications included in the contract.
Very truly yours,

fies II. Zoxxyki
Lee President
Generation Engineering
Construction, Operations
JHZ:dm
Attachment

cc:

J. Fielder
R. Madsen

/

(£Llg frLu ^^L A^^J

NEVADA POWER COMPANY

CERTIFIED MAIL NO.: 800547

J A M E S H. Z O R N E S
V e t President
Generation Engineering.
Construction. Operations

April 2 7 , 1984

Mr. John Dragos
Executive Vice President
Diamond Shamrock Coal Sales
1200 First Security Plaza
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
Dear Mr. Dragos:
As ve have previously indicated to you, coal shipments received since the
first of the year by Nevada Power Company under the Coal Sales Agreement
with your company have not met the minimum quality specifications of that
Agreement. Deliveries of coal have been suspended. We have subsequently
received information from you indicating that the inadequacy in quality may
not be curable.
Pursuant to Section 4.3 of the Coal Sales Agreement of March 1, 1980,
Nevada Power Company is exercising its right to suspend shipments until
evidence is produced that shipments will meet the quality specifications
of the Agreement. Because of operational and commercial constraints,
Nevada Power Company must receive such evidence prior to August 1, 1984.
Should such evidence not be provided, Nevada Power will consider the Agreement to be terminated.
Very truly yours,
s

ftl4l£>0

J.^H. Zorn«, Vice President
Generation Engineering,
Construction and Operations
/gpe
bcc:
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March 1, I960

Trail fountain Coal Company*
P. O. Box 34
Somerset:, PA 15501
Gentlemen:
Letter Agreement
In further consideration of the Coal Sales Agreement between the parties
of ftarch 1, 1980, Trail Mountain aqrees to fulfill certain of Nevada's obligations with regard to delivery of coal to Swisher Coal.Company under Lhe
Agreement for Loading Services between Swisher Coal Company and Nevada Power
Cor.pany dated :-:arch 1, 1SS0, to wit:
••Purchaser shall have delivered, by truck to Seller at the raw-coal storage facility. Purchaser's coal for conveyance to the unit-train loadinq
facility in anounts whereby at least two (2) times the tonnage that is required to load one (1) unit train is available in the storaqe area twelve
(12) hours prior to the beginning of the load cycle for any unit train scheduled. The Seller will provide and maintain storage space' at the
Facilities for Purchaser's coal for a minimum of three (3) times the
quantity of coal required to load one (1) unit train.*4
Tne above obligation shall be limited by the following force majeure
provisions:
•"Force Majeure** as used herein shall mean a cause reasonably beyond the
control of the Seller or Purchaser, as the case nay be, which wholly or in
substantial part prevents loading at the Facilities or the delivery of
coal to the Facilities by Purchaser. Examples (without limitations) of
foice majeure, but only if reasonably beyond the control of the Seller or
Purchaser, as the case may be, are the following: acts of God; acts of
the public enemy; insurrectioniVriots; strikes, labor disputes; work
stoppages; fires; explosions; floods; electric power failures; major
breakdowns or dar.aqe to equipment; interruptions of transportation; embargoes; and orders or acts of governmental (including, without limitation, a city or county ordinance, an act of a state legislature, an act of
the United States Congress and a final Judicial decision, order or decree
based upon order or acts of aovernmental authorities); or military authority.

Trail

Mftimt'ain

foal

Prmnanv

2

March 1, 1980

"If, because of force majeure, either Purchaser or Seller is unable to
carry out its oblications under this Agreement, and if such party promptly
gives the other party hereto written notice of such force majeure, the obligations and liabilities of the party giving such .notice and the corresponding oblications of the other party shall be suspended to the extent
nvade necessary by and during the continuance of such force majeure;
provided however, that the disabling effects of such force majeure shall
be eliminated as soon as, and to the extent possible (except that either
party r.ay settle any of its ovn labor disputes, strikes, or terminate any
of its own lockouts in its sole discretion).**
If you concur with the above, please sign as provided below.
Very truly yours,

Gibbs
e Vice President
Approved and Accepted this
1st day of March, 1980.
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY

APPENDIX 3
AMENDED COMPLAINT (JURY DEMANDED)

Williaa B. Bohling
Randall N. Skanchy, of
JOKES, WALDO, HOLBROOK k McDONOUGH. P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, a :
California corporation,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:

AMENDED COMPLAINT
(JURY DEMANDED)

t

vs.

:

NEVADA POWER COMPANY, &
Nevada corporation, and
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY,
a Pennsylvania corporation,

:
:
s
s

Defendants.

Civil No. C-84-06B6A

s

Plaintiff, Trail Mountain Coal Company, through its
counsel of record, hereby complains of the defendants Nevada
Power Conpany and Atlantic Richfield Company, as follows:
I.

DESCRIPTION OF PARTIES; JURISDICTION AND VENUE
!•

Plaintiff• Trail Mountain Coal Conpany

(hereinafter referred to as HTrail Mountain"), is and was at

all times material hereto, a California corporation with its
principal place of business in Enery County, State of Utah*
Trail Mountain owns and operates the Trail Mountain Coal Mine
located in Emery County, State of Utah*
2.

Defendant Nevada Fewer Company (hereinafter

referred to as "ti?C"),

is and was at all times material hereto

a Nevada corporation, with its principal place of business in
the state of Nevada,
3.

NPC is and was at all times material hereto

authorized to do business in the State of Utah and was doing
business on a regular basis within the State of Utah, and this
Court has general in personam jurisdiction over NPC for all
purposes•
4.

Defendant Atlantic Richfield Company (hereinafter

referred to as "ARCO"), is and was at all tines material hereto
a Pennsylvania corporation/ with its principal place of
business in the state of Pennsylvania*
5*

ARCO is and was at all times material hereto

authorized to do business in the State of Utah and was doing
business on a regular basis within the State of Utah/ and this
Court has general in personam jurisdiction over ARCO for all
purposes*

ARCO owns and operates the Swisher Coal Company, a

Utah corporation involved in the production of coal, located in
Carbon County, State of Utah*
6,

The contracts on which Trail Mountain's claims

against NPC and ARCO are founded are to be performed by
Plaintiff and Defendants in the State of Utah,
1.

The contracts on which Trail Mountain's claims

against NPC and ARCO are founded provides that Plaintiff was to
supply and NPC and ARCO were to receive coal in the State of
Utah pursuant to such contracts.
8*

The contracts on which Trail Mountain's claims

against NPC and ARCO are founded provide that the contracts are
to be construed and performed in accordance with the laws of
the State of Utah applicable to agreements made and to be
performed in the State of Utah.
9.

NPC has neglected, refused and otherwise failed

to perform in accordance with the provisions of such contract,
causing injury to Trail Mountain and others in the State of
Utah.
10.

ARCO has neglected, refused and otherwise failed

to perform in accordance with the provisions of such contract,
causing injury to Trail Mountain and others in the State of
Utah.

11.

This Court has jurisdiction over all claims set

forth herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 by virtue of the fact
that plaintiff and defendants are citizens of different states
and the matter in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs,
exceeds Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00).

Venue ia properly

before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391*
11 > FACTS
12.

On or about March 1, 1980f NPC and Trail Mountain

entered into a ccal sales agreement, a true and correct copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein
by this reference (the "Trail Mountain/tfPC Contract").
13.

Pursuant to the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, NPC

agreed to purchase from Trail Mountain specified tonnages of
coal per year for the indefinite term of the contract.

For

calendar years 1983 and thereafter, NPC was required to
purchase 300,000 tons of coal from Trail Mountain, but which
quantity could be reduced to 200,000 tons per year at m?C's
election*

The contract could not be terminated prior to

'Decenber 31, 1994, and then only upon two years prior written
notice.
14.

The contract listed, among other specifications

for the coal, a three percent raaxinuin sodiun oxide content in
the ash.

15,

Swisher Coal Company, a Utah corporation, and a

wholly owned subsidiary of ARCO, and NPr entered into a coal
supply agreement dated as of March 1, 1980/ a true and correct
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit

H

B" and

incorporated herein by this reference (hereinafter referred to
as the "ARCO/NPC Contract").
16*

Pursuant to the ARCO/NPC Contract, NPC agreed to

purchase between 225,000 and 275,000 tons of coal per year from
ARCO, which coal was a blend of coal including coal to be
purchased by ARCO frcra Trail Mountain.
17.

As an integral part of the ARCO/NPC Contract,

Trail Mountain and ARCO entered into a coal supply agreement
dated as of January 3, 1980, a true and correct copy of which
is attached hereto as Exhibit "Cn and incorporated herein by
this reference {hereinafter referred to as the "Trail
Mountain/ARCO Contract")•
IB.

Pursuant to the Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract,

ARCO agreed to purchase 120,000 tons of coal per year frora
Trail Mountain from January 1, 1980 through December 31, 1994.
19.

Since the inception of the Trail Mountain/tJPC and

Trail Mountain/ARCO Contracts in early 1980, Trail Mountain has
consistently shipped the tonnage of coal required pursuant to
each contract, while the sodium oxide content of the ash in the

Trail Mountain reserves has consistently exceeded three
percent.

At no time prior to late 1983, did NPC complain or

otherwise object to the 'sodiura oxide content of Trail Mountain
Mine coal*

ARCG itself has newer

objected to the sodium

content of Trail Mountain Mine coal, and ARCO did not
communicate any objection froa NPC until May 1984,

All such

monthly shipments prior to such dates were accepted and paid
for as full compliance with the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract and
the Trial Mountain/ARCO Contract.
20.

As late as January 1984, officials frora NPC told

Trail Mountain personnel that the quality of Trail Mountain
Mine coal was very good and that they were very pleased with
Trail Mountain Mine coal*
21.

Pursuant to the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, NPC

requested that the annual shipments of coal for calendar year
1983 be reduced frora 300,000 to 200,000 tons.

Trail Mountain

complied with this request.
22.

On August 13, 1983, NPC requested that Trail

'Mountain voluntarily reduce coal shipments by an additional 15%
below the 200,000 ton minimum contained in the contract.

NPC

apparently sought this reduction because abundant river flows
had generated excess hydro-electric power, which power, on
information and belief, is less expensive than coal-generated

23,

Trail Mountain informed NPC that a reduction of

the Trail Mountain Mine's production by an additional 15% would
mean lowering production to an uneconomical operational level,
and expressed to NPC a willingness to reduce its production by
15% if NPC would make certain concessions to Trail Mountain,
NPC refused to make such concessions, but continued to insist
that Trail Mountain reduce its coal shipments by 15% below the
minimum specified in the Trail Kountain/NPC Contract.

No

agreenent to alter the contract was reached by Trail Mountain
and NPC*
24,

In late 1983, for the first tine, NPC informed

Trail Mountain that the coal frorr, the Trail Mountain Mine
allegedly did not comply with the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract
specifications because of a high sodium oxide content, and on
March 20, 1984, NPC informed Trail Mountain that further
shipments of Trail Mountain Mine coal must be suspended unless
all specifications, including sodium oxide content were met,
25,

In May 1984, ARCO informed Trail Mountain that

NPC had notified ARCO that the coal from the Trail Mountain
Mine was unsatisfactory to NPC*

ARCO suspended shipments under

the Trail Mountain/ARCO agreenent because of NPC's complaints,
and ARCO refused to accept further delivery of Trail Mountain
Mine coal.

26•

Negotiations between Trail Mountain and NFC took

place during the spring and summer of 1984*

Solely as an

accommodation to NPC, and not as an admission of any obligation
pursuant to the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, Trail .Mountain
succeeded in locating a coal supplier whose coal could be mixed
with Trail Mountain's coal and achieve a mix with a maximum
sodium oxide content of less than three percent*

Consequently,

Trail Mountain offered to supply a 50/50 mix of Trail Mountain
coal and substitute coal to NFC pursuant to the provisions of
the Trail Mountain/NPC Contractr and thus provide coal in
strict conformity with the language of the Trail Mountain/NPC
Contract as originally drafted.
27 • NFC's response to this substitute coal offer was
to permit such substitution and blending of the coal, but not
without imposing additional unreasonable conditions upon Trail
Mountain that are not contained in the Contractr including but
not limited to, requiring "perfect blending", a guaranty that
the blended coal would not adversely affect operations of the
.Reid Gardner units4 an agreement that Trail Mountain pay $1000
per day for damages to the Reid Gardner units# and a reduction
in the price for the coal.
28.

Subsequentlyi NPC withdrew the additional

unreasonable conditions to the coal substitution proposal/ but

stated that HPC did not accept the substitution proposal and
terminated the Trail Mountain/UPC Contract effective August 1,
1984.
29.

As a direct and proximate result of NPC's breach

and wrongful acts, Trail Mountain will suffer money danages as
follows:
a.

Lost profits from the Trail Mountain/NPC

Contract in an anount of no less than Ten Million One
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($10,100,000.00);
b.

Ldst profits from the Trail Mountain/ARCO

Contract in an amount of no less than Seven Million
Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($7,250,000.00);
c#

The wrongful termination of the Trail

Mountain/NPC and Trail Mountain/ARCO Contracts will
necessitate the closing of the Trail Mountain Mine,
which will result in a loss of sales of Trail Mountain
coal to third parties causing damages of not less than
Ten Million Dollars ($10,000,000.00);
d.

Damages directly resulting from closing

costs of the nine* idle costs, personnel severance and
other costs, lease obligations and related expenses in
an amount of not less than Nine Million Dollars
($9,000,000.00):

e.

Other incidental and consequential danages

in an amount of not less than Ten Million Dollars
($10,000,000.00),
30.

As a direct and proximate result of ARCO's breach

and wrongful acts. Trail Mountain will suffer money damages as
follows:
a.

Lost profits from the Trail Mountain/ARCO

Contract in an amount of no less than Seven Million
Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars (£7,250,000.00)?
b.

The wrongful termination of the Trail

Mountain/ARCO Contract will necessitate the closing of
the Trail Mountain Mine, which will result in a loss
of sales of Trail Mountain coal to third parties
causing damages of not less than Ten Million Dollars
($10,000,000.00);
c.

Damages directly resulting fron closing

costs of the mine, idle costs, personnel severance and
other costs, lease obligations and related expenses in
an amount of not less than Nine Million Dollars
($9.000,000*00);
d.

Other incidental and consequential damages

in an amount of not less than Ten Million Dollars
(310,000,000.00).

31.

If NPC is not innediately required to accept

delivery of and pay for Trail Mountain coal pursuant to the
Trail Mountain/NPC Contract and accept deliveries of coal under
the ARCO/NPC Contract including Trail Mountain coal, the
following irreparable injuries will be incurred by Trail
Mountain, third parties, and the public:
a.
nine*

Trail Mountain will be required to close the

While Trail Mountain would comply with all laws

relating to mine safety procedures, closure of the
nine will probably result in the fresh air equipment
being shut off or removed, temperature changes within
the cine, carbon dioxide collection in the mine unless
fan equipment is continuously operated, and as a
result the nine infrastructure will likely
deteriorate, thus increasing the risk of the mine
becoming a health hazard to the public in and around
the mine area, and increasing the health hazards and
risks associated with any reopening and work to be
done within the mine;
b*

Closing of the mine will likely result in a

decrease or discontinuance of the maintenance of the
mine 4 * infrastructure and all equipnent left within
the mine*

Increased moisture will collect in the

mine, and the possibility of infrastructure and
equipment failure will increase, increasing the risk
of safety hazards to persons and the public in and
around the mine area, and increasing the dangers and
risks upon any reopening or work to be performed
within the mine;
c.

Closing of the mine will result in the loss

of the mine's experienced work force, which has a low
injury rate, and valuable training and experience in
the Trail Mountain mine*

This work force is difficult

to replace and cannot be compensated with money
damages, and any reopening of the mine with a new work
force that is less highly trained and less familiar
with this particular mine will increase the risks and
danger to such work force and others and the public in
and around the mine upon any reopening or work to be
done within the mine.

The mine workers, who will be

laid off during a time of a depressed coal marketr
will suffer direct and irreparable injury.
Ill,

CAUSES OF ACTIOS
COUNT 1

32.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 31 above.

33*

The Trail Mountain/NPC Contract is an

"installment contract" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann*
§ 70A-2-612.
34.

The monthly coal shipments from Trail Mountain to

ti?C substantially conform to all material provisions of the
Trail Kountain/tfPC Contract, and the sodium oxide content of
Trail Mountain coal does not substantially impair the value of
any .one or all installments of coal shipped to NPC#
35.

By KPC1s refusal to accept delivery of Trail

Mountain Mine coalf NPC has breached the Trail Mountain/NPC
Contract and is liable to Trail Mountain for such breach of
contract in an amount' to be determined at the trial of this
action,
COUNT II
36.

Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained

in paragraphs 1 through 3 5 above•
37.

$T>C consistently accepted delivery of Trail

Mountain coal during the first four years of the contractf and
•Trail Mountain continued to rely upon such acceptance by NPC
and performed in accordance with the contract*
38*

NPC sought to breach the contract by requiring

Trail Mountain to reduce coal shipments by fifteen percent
belcw the minimum amount specified in the Contract, apparently

in response to and as a result of NPC's ability to buy
hydro-electric power at cheaper rates*
39-

When Trail Mountain refused to allow NPC to

breach the Contract by reducing coal shipments# NPC utilized
the alleged failure to meet the sodium oxide content criteria
in the Contract as a subterfuge for the improper purpose of
eliminating all shipments of coal under the Trail Mountain/NPC
Contract,
40.

By virtue of the acts complained of herein, NPC

breached the Trail Mountain/HFC Contract and breached its
obligations of fair dealing, reasonableness and good faith
contained explicitly 'and implicitly in the Contract and as
prescribed by statute, for which breach Trail Mountain is
entitled to damages from NPC in an amount to be determined at
the trial of this action.
COUNT III
41.

Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations

contained in paragraphs 1 through 40 above•
42*

During the four year course of performance and

course of dealing pursuant to the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract,
Trail Mountain's shipments of coal from the Trail Mountain Mine
and acceptance and payment for such coal by NPC, established

the terms of the Contract and the conformance of Trail Mountain
Mine coal in accordance with the ContrwCt.
43.

The course of performance and course of dealing

between NPC and Trail Mountain with respect to the Contract
modified such contract to eliminate a specific sodium oxide
content requirement for Trail Mountain Mine coal and such
contract provides that Trail Mountain coal is acceptable and in
conformance with such modified contractual provisions.
44.

HFC's refusal to accept Trail Mountain Mine coal

is in breach of the NPC Contract and Trail Mountain is entitled
to damages from NPC in an amount to be deterained at the trial
of this action.
COUNT IV
45.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the

allegations in paragraphs 1 through 44 above*
46*

During the four years of performance pursuant to

the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, whereby Trail Mountain
supplied coal to NPC, NPC has waived any requirement that
soaium oxide in the Trail Mountain Mine coal ash be less than
three percent through its acquiescence and acceptance of Trail
Mountain Mine coal as performance pursuant to the Contract.
47.

Trail Mountain relied on the waiver of the sodium

oxide content specifications to the detriment of Trail M m m f a ^

byt among other things, Trail Mountain's failure to see* or
accept alternative contracts or purchasers for Trail Mountain
Mine coal during the course of the four years of performance
pursuant to the KPC Contract; and Trail Mountain's reopening,
maintaining and operating of the mine*
48.

NPC has waived any requirement that sodium oxide

content in Trail Mountain Mine coal not exceed three percent,
and MPC's refusal to accept Trail Mountain Mine coal with a
sodium oxide content in excess

of three percent is a breach of

the Contract and Trail Mountain is entitled to damages in an
anount to be determined at trial.
COUNT V
49.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 48 above*
50. - The Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract is an
"installment contract" within the meaning of the Utah Code Ann*
§ 70A-2-612.
51.

The monthly coal shipments from Trail Mountain to

ARCO substantially conform to all material provisions of the
Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract,
52 «. By ARCO* s refusal to accept delivery of Trail
Mountain Mine coal, ARCO has breached the Trail Mountain/ARCO
Contract and is liable to Trail Mountain for such breach of

contract in &n amount to be determined at the trial of this
action*
COUNT VI
53*

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 52 above.
54*

ARCO has refused to accept shipments of Trail

Mountain coal because NPC informed ARCO that Trail Mountain
Mine coal is unacceptable for use in NPC's Feid Gardner station*
55.

The coal from the Trail Mountain Mine is in

conformance with the ARCO/NPC Contract and the Trail
Mountain/AJRCO Contract, and NFC's refusal to accept Trail
Mountain Mine coal through its blending with ARCO coal is a
breach of the ARCO/NPC Contract of which Trail Mountain is an
intended third-party beneficiaTy.
56. .The terms of the ARCO/NPC Contract that coal
supplied to NPC must be satisfactory for use at the Reid
Gardner station has been contemporaneously interpreted during
the term of that contract and Trail Mountain mine coal has
consistently been and remains satisfactory for use by NPC, and
NPC has waived any requirement# if any* that such coal contain
a sodium oxide content not exceeding three percent.
57.

NPC's refusal to accept coal from the Trail

Mountain Mine to be blended with ARCO coal pursuant to the

ARCO/NPC Contract is a breach of the ARCO/NPC Contract, and
Trail Mountain is entitled to damages in an amount to be
determined at trial,
COUNT VII
58*

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 57 above.
59.

The Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract provides that

ARCO. will purchase from Trail Mountain a minimum of 120/000
tons of coal per year, and that such coal should be
satisfactory for use in NPC's Reid Gardner plant.
CO.

Trail Mountain Mine coal is satisfactory for use

at NPC'8 Reid Gardner'plant.
61.

WPC has, during the first four years of the

ARCO/NPC Contract, accepted Trail Mountain coal for use at
NPC's Peid Gardner plant, and through this course of
performance has established Trail Mountain coal as satisfactory
for use at the Reid Gardner plant.
62.

NPC has wrongfully induced ARCO to refuse to

"accept delivery cf Trail Mountain coal pursuant to the Trail
Kountain/ARCO Contract•
63.

NPC % s interference with and inducement to breach

the Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract has caused direct, incidental
and consequential damages to Trail Mountain, and Trail Mountain

is entitled to money damages against NPC in an amount to be
determined at trial.
COUNT VIII
64.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through €3 above.
65.

Paragraph 2,2 of the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract

provides that Trail Mountain has the right to supply substitute
coal to NPC, subject to NPC's approval, which approval will not
be unreasonably withheld.
66.

Trail Mountain offered to NPC a substitute

mixture of its coal and another supplier's ccal with an
aggregate sodium oxide content under three percentf not as an
adaission of any requirement in the contract that coal have a
sodium oxide content of less than three percent, but solely as
an accommodation to NPC and in an effort to deal in good faith
to ireet the demands of NPC.
67.

NPC refused to accept such substitute coal

without conditions that were not set forth or contemplated in
the NPC Contract, and which conditions were unreasonable!
unworkable, burdensome and oppressive.
68.

NPC's refusal to accept substitute coal from

Trail Mountain constitutes a breach of the Trail Mountain/NPC

Contract and Trail Mountain is entitled to damages in an amount
to be determined at trial.
COUNT IX
69.

riaintiff incorporates herein by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 68 above.
70.

NPC's breach of the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract

as set forth in Counts I, II, III, IV, and VII above $ and NPC's
breach of the ARCO/NPC Contract in which Trail Mountain is a
third-party beneficiary, and NPC's improper interference with
the Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract, will result in immediate
irreparable damages to Trail Mountain, third parties and the
public, by increasing the risks and dangers of the Trail
Mountain Mine by increasing the deterioration of the
infra-structure and equipment in such nine, and increasing
health and safety dangers on the occasion of the mine's
reopening, and will cause irreparable injury due to the loss of
an experienced and well-trained work force familiar with the
mine, and will increase the risk to the mine workers upon a
'reopening of the mine with different personnel•

The nine

employees will also suffer immediate and direct irreparable
injury,
71.

Trail Mountain is entitled to a preliminary and

permanent injunction requiring UPC to commence immediately and

continue purchasing Trail Mountain coal in accordance with the
Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, and to require &PC to inform
immediately and instruct ARCO to accept delivery and pay for
Trail Mountain coal pursuant to the Trail Mountain/ARCO
Contract and the ARCO/NPC Contract.
WHEREFORE, Trail Mountain prays for judgment against
NPC and ARCO as follows:
A.

For a preliminary and permanent injunction

requiring NPC to commence immediately and continue acceptance
of and make payment for Trail Mountain coal in accordance with
the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, and to require m?C to
immediately inforn and instruct ARCO to accept delivery and pay
for Trail Mountain coal pursuant to the Trail Mountain/ARCO
Contract and for NPC to accept delivery and pay for Trail
Mountain coal.as blended under the ARCO/NPC Contract,
B.

For a money judgment against BPC in an amount of

not less than Forty-six Million Two Hundred Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($46,250,000.00)*
C*

For a money judgment against ARCO in an amount of

not less than Twenty-seven Million Seve)i Hundred Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($27,750,000.00).
D.

For interest on the amount of all damages at the

legal rate from the date of NPC's and ARCO's suspension of

C3'd 1H101

acceptance of Trail Mountain coal through judgment and at the
judgment rate from the date of judgment until paid,
D.

For all costs of this action.

E.

For such other and further relief as the Court

deems just and equitable.
DATED this ffi^ day of March, 1985.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK, & MCDONOUGH

Randall N.~ Skanchy
>chy
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Plaintiff's Address*
1200 First Security Plasa
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
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RNS

APPENDIX 4
AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT,
AND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM OF NEVADA POWER COMPANY

Elliott Lee Pratt (A2641)
Edwin C. Barnes (0217)
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS & CAHOON
Attorneys for Defendant
77 West Second South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-2516
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, a,
California corporation,

]

Plaintiff,
l AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S
AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND AMENDED
1 COUNTERCLAIM OF NEVADA POWER
1
COMPANY
]
]'

vs.

NEVADA POWER COMPANY, a
Nevada corporation,
Defendant.

]

vs.

]

DIAMOND SHAMROCK COAL COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,
\
DIAMOND SHAMROCK COAL SALES
]
CORPORATION, a Delaware corpora-]i
tion, NATOMAS COAL COMPANY, a
]
California corporation and
]
W.K. MINERALS, a California
]
corporation,
]
Additional Counterclaim Defendants.

COMES

NOW

Nevada

Amended Complaint
defendant
grounds:

Power

relief

Judge J. Thomas Greene

]
]

Company

for its failure

upon which

Civil No. C-84-0686G

can

and

moves

to

dismiss

to state a claim against
be granted/

upon

the

the
this

following

(a)

The plaintiff. Trail Mountain Coal Company, a California

corporation, was organized in 1981 first by Natomas Coal Company
and thereafter by Diamond Shamrock to act as an operating agent
for the Trail Mountain

mine first of Natomas Coal Company and

thereafter of Diamond Shamrock Coal Company, who the real parties
in interest, and for the further reason that the operation and
ownership of the mine in question is under the con.trol and direction of Natomas Coal Company and Diamond Shamrock Coal Company
which, under the provisions of Rule 17(a), should be the real parties in interest in this action.
(b)

Under Counts V, VI, and VII, plaintiff

seeks damages

either directly against Arco or as a third-party beneficiary under
a Nevada Power Company/Swisher Coal Company Contract, Exhibit B,
when under the law and under the provisions of the applicable
contracts, Exhibits A, B, & C.

Plaintiff is not a third-party

beneficiary and its claim, if any, is against Swisher Coal Company and not against this defendant.
(c)

The Amended

Complaint

is seeking

specific performance

under both a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction and
fails to state relief justifying injunctive relief in the following particulars:
(i)

There is no allegation of an inadequate remedy at

law, but to the contrary, the Amended Complaint claims ascertainable damages for breach of contract.
(ii)
able
OH, P R A T T ,
5 & CAHOON
RNEYS AT LAW
roiriu

CAUIMAC

There are no allegations of an immediate irrepar-

injury.

Instead,

the claim

is only

for

future and

clearly speculative events/ rather than immediate causal factors.
(iii)

There are no allegations showing

the probability

of success on the merits.
(iv)

The public policy and irreparable

injury allega-

tions of paragraphs 27 and 62 are either immaterial
injunction

proceeding

or

are

clearly

eliminated

to the

by

Trail

Mountain's compliance with existing mining statutes and regulations

set

forth

under

30

C.F.R.

75.1171-1/

75.1171-3/

75.325 and 30 C.F.R. 75.330.
(v)

There are no allegations that the relative

hard-

ship to the defendant/ notwithstanding the bond/ is less than
on the plaintiff.
(d)

The action

waiver

of quality

U.C.A.

70A-2-612

claiming

requirements
and

further

Exhibit A to the Complaint/
failure of either party

modification
is
by

of

the

contract

and

barred

by

the

provisions

Section

13

of

the

which provides

of

contract/

inter alia/

that

to insist upon strict performance

the

shall

not be construed as a waiver of such provisions/ but such provisions shall continue in full force and effect.
(e)

Plaintiff's

Amended

Complaint

also

fails

to

state

a

claim upon which relief can be granted in that it fails to allege
that the alleged modified Contract has any specific or necessary
terms either expressed

or implied/

and

thus the allegations are

deficient as a matter of law; in that the allegations

concerning

modification and waiver do not state a cause of action/ and there

are no allegations to show privity in the plaintiff and thus a
right to sue on the Contract.
The use of the term "Trail Mountain" in this Amended Answer
and Amended Counterclaim*

unless otherwise designated as "Trail

Mountain Utah/" for purposes of simplifying the terminology shall
be deemed to refer to Natomas Coal Company, Diamond Shamrock Coal
Company, as the owner, operator, and principle responsible entity
for the Trail Mountain Mine, Diamond Shamrock Coal Sales Corporation and to Plaintiff as the agent, operator and alter ego of the
Diamond

Shamrock

Coal Company

and

Shamrock

Coal

Sales

Corpor-

ation

FIRST DEFENSE
in response to the specific allegations of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Nevada Power admits, denies and alleges as follows:

I.
DESCRIPTION OF PARTIES; JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 1, but admits that

Trail Mountain Coal Company is a California corporation qualified
to do business in the State of Utah; and alleges affirmatively
that the Trail Mountain Coal Mine is owned and operated by the
Diamond Shamrock Coal Company, through its agent and employees in
Trail Mountain Coal company, plaintiff.
2.

Admits the allegations of paragraph 2.

3.

Admits the allegations of paragraph 3.

as the agents operator and alter ego of the Diamond Shamrock Coal
Company and Shamrock Coal Sales Corporation.
Defendant

Nevada

Power

Company

("Nevada

Power")

answers

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiff's

Amended

Complaint

fails

to state

a claim

which relief can be granted in that it fails to allege
alleged

modified

Contract

has

either expressed or implied/

any

and

specific

or

that the

necessary

thus the allegations

upon

terms

are defi-

cient as a matter of law, and also in that the allegations concerning modification and waiver do not state a cause of action.
SECOND DEFENSE
In

response

to

the

specific

allegations

of

Plaintiff's

Complaint/ Nevada Power pleads as follows:

I.
DESCRIPTION OF PARTIES: JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 1/ but admits that

Trail Mountain Coal Company is a California corporation qualified
to do business
that

in the State

the Trail Mountain

of Utah; and alleges

Coal Mine is owned

and

affirmatively

operated

by the

Diamond Shamrock Coal Company/ through its agent and employees in
Trail Mountain Coal company/ plaintiff.
2.

Admits the allegations of paragraph 2.

3.

Admits the allegations of paragraph 3.

4e

Denies the allegations of paragraph 4 because of insuf-

ficient information upon which to form a belief as to the truth
thereof.
5c
ficient

Denies the allegations of paragraph 5 because of insuf~
information upon which to form a belief as to the truth

thereof,
6.

Admits

that

the

referenced

contracts

are

to be

formed in the State of Utah but denies that Plaintiff

per-

is a party

to those contractSe
7c

Denies the allegations of paragraph 7.

8.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 8/ but admits that

the Nevada Power Company/Trail Mountain Utah Contract/ Exhibit A,
so provides*
9o
ficient

Denies the allegations of paragraph 9 because of insufinformation upon which to form a belief as to the

truth

thereof.
10.

Denies

insufficient

the

allegations

information

of

upon which

paragraph

10

because

to form a belief

as

of

to the

truth thereof.
11.

Admits the allegations of paragraph 11.

II.
FACTS
12.
that

LYDE. PRATT,
JBS & C A H O O N
rORNEYS AT LAW
AMERICAN SAVINGS

Denies

on or about

the

allegations

March

1/

of

paragraph

1980, defendant

12/

entered

but

alleges

into a Coal

Sales Agreement with the Trail Mountain Coal Company, a Utah corporation/

a true copy of which

is attached

to the Complaint

as

Exhibit "A", but alleges further that said Agreement was modified
thereto also dated March 1,

by an Amendment
been

attached

to

the

Exhibit

"A".

1980 which

Nevada

Power

has not

affirmativly

alleges that Plaintiff is not the Company which executed

the Coal

Sales Agreement/ but that said Utah corporation has been liquidated/ its assets and liabilities having been distributed

to enti-

ties other than plaintiff/ the true identities which have not yet
been determined.
13.
poration

Admits that Trail Mountain Coal Company/

the Utah cor-

("Trail Mountain Utah") agreed to sell and Nevada agreed

to purchase specified

tonnages of coal per year for the term of

the contract; admits that for the year 1983 and subsequent
and

under

certain

conditions

the

quantity

could

be

years

reduced

to

200/000 tons per year at the election of NPC; alleges that under
Section 3 of the Contract/
tons and

the quantities were reduced to 200,000

to 100/000 by agreement

tons

in particular

denies all other allegations of paragraph 13.
affirmatively

that

years; and

Defendant

the coal had to meet certain

specific

alleges
sodium

requirements and certain specific ash fusion temperature requirements/ and that Nevada Power had the right under the contract to
suspend further delivery and purchase of coal which did not meet
such requirements on any two consecutive deliveries.

Said provi-

sion also/ in substance/ provides that the contract could be terminated for cause.

Absent justifiable cause/ the term of the con-

tract was indefinite, but could be terminated for other than cause
at any time after December 31/ 1994/ upon two years prior written
notice by either party.
14^

Admits

the allegations

of

paragraph

14/

but

alleges

affirmatively that the contract also required a minimum temperature of 2#200 degrees Fahrenheit for ash fusion*
15*
iary

Admits that Swisher Coal Company/ a wholly owned subsid-

of Atlantic

defendant

entered

Richfield
into

a

Company/
Coal

referred

Supply

to as ARCO/ and

Agreement

dated

as

of

March 1/ 1980, that a true and correct copy of the original contract before modifications is attached as Exhibit B, and alleges
that there were amendments to said contract which have not been
attached to Exhibit B.
16.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 16/ but admits the

quantities to be purchased as alleged.
17.

Denies

the

allegations

of

paragraph

17

and

alleges

affirmatively that the claimed Exhibit C appears in fact to have
been executed in part by a corporation designated as the Fetterolf
Group/

Inc./ rather than by plaintiff/ and the Fetterolf Group

would be a proper and necessary plaintiff herein since there are
no allegations of privity

between

the original parties

to the

Contract and the plaintiff.
18.

Alleges that the contract speaks for itself.

19.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 19/ and alleges as

follows:

The Trail Mountain

Utah represented

to Nevada Power

prior to execution of the Coal Sales Agreement that the coal would
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meet the maximum of 3 percent sodium content in its ash and said
term was thereupon agreed to and placed in the contract.

Most of

the Trail Mountain coal shipments have consisted of coal with more
than the maximum percentage of 3 percent sodium in the ash.
Mountain knew or reasonably
not

meet

time

3 percent

informed

requirement.

sodium

Nevada

should

have known that

requirement

Power

that

but/

said

Trail

the coal did

nevertheless/

coal

did

not

at no

meet

said

From time to time the Trail Mountain coal had var-

ious deficiencies in it which caused operating problems and which
deficiencies were contrary to the quality specifications set forth
in the contract and Nevada Power.
ysis

showed Nevada

POwer

that

In August/ 1981/ a coal anal-

one shipment

supposedly

of

Trail

Mountain Coal did not meet the 3 percent maximum sodium percentage
requirement and so informed Trail Mountain Utah.

However/

Trail

Mountain throughout the contract/ continued to assure Nevada Power
that Trail Mountain Mine coal did meet all the requirments under
the contract.

In late 1983 Nevada Power had increasingly exces-

sive shutdowns because of "slagging" and or "fouling" in its boilers and questioned ARCO concerning its coal supply.

Thereafter in

order to attempt to isolate the cause of the increasing slagging/
Nevada

Power undertook

tests

in early March/

1984/ of

the

five

consecutive shipments made by Trail Mountain in January/ February/
and

March/

1984.

Said

tests

showed

that

all

five

train

exceeded the 3 percent maximum sodium oxide ash content.
ately
coal

upon learning
in at least

for the

first

two consecutive

time

that

the Trail

loads

ImmediMountain

shipments was contained

higher

sodium

content

in

the

ash

than

the

contract

permitted,

Nevada

Power notified Trail Mountain and plaintiff at a meeting on March
19/ 1984, followed by a letter on March 20/ 1984/ that the coal
shipments would have to be suspended under the Contract provisions
until the coal could be upgraded to meet the contract requirements
on sodium content and ash fusion temperatures.

Since 1980 defen-

dant was purchasing Trail Mountain coal along with coal from several other suppliers for use at the defendant's Reid-Gardner Plant
in Nevada/ and thus the specific cause of prior slagging was not
isolated until the March testing/ at which time it was determined
by Nevada Power that the Trail Mountain Mine coal in two consecutive shipments did not meet the contract quality
20*

Denies the allegations of paragraph 20 and alleges that

Nevada
about

specification.

Power
the

Company

quality

of

continually
the

Trail

complained
Mountain

to

coal

Trail
and

Mountain

continually

received assurances over these years that the coal was meeting all
requirements under the contract.
21«

With regard

to the allegations of paragraph 21/ admits

that Nevada Power requested of Diamond Shamrock Coal Company

that

the annual shipments of coal for calender year 1983 be reduced in
accordance with and as permitted by the Contract and affirmatively
alleges

that

Diamond

Shamrock

Coal

Company

complied

with

that

request.
22*

Denies the allegations of paragraph 22/ and alleges that

a proposal to reduce coal shipments by 15 percent was made to all
of the eight Nevada Power coal suppliers/ some of whom voluntarily
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agreed

to

the

reduction

and

Mountain^ did not so agree.

some

of

whom/

including

Trail

Nevada Power asked for this 15 per-

cent reduction because of a substantial drop in the anticipated
electric load required of Nevada Power to serve its many customers.
23.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 23/ and alleges that

Trail Mountain responded to the letter suggesting the reduction by
unreasonably

requesting

500/000 tons of coal.

an

increase

of

the

contract

minimum

Upon receipt of this unreasonable

to

request/

Nevada Power simply did not pursue the matter further and left it
up to Trail Mountain whether or not it would

voluntarily

reduce

its sale by 15 percent and Trail Mountain elected not to do so.
Thus/ the matter was dropped.
24.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 24 as alleged in the

Amended Complaint and affirmatively alleges and admits that there
had been several complaints

throughout

quality which complaints were both

the years concerning

in writing

and oral.

coal

Admits

that in approximately 1983 Nevada Power informed Diamond Shamrock
Coal Company that its coal might not comply with the sodium oxide
specification;
informed

admits

Diamond

shipments of such
sodium
that

oxide

that

Shamrock

Coal

coal would

specification

it was not

on

March

20/

1984/

Nevada

Company

by

letter

that

be suspended

was

until December

unless and

met.

Defendant

1983/

that

further

until

further

slagging

Power

and

the

alleges
fouling

became so consistent that the testing of the specific Trail Mountain

Mine

train

loads

delivered

during

January/

February/

and

March of 1984 became absolutely necessary to determine the quality
of the coal that it was determined

that Trail Mountain Mine coal

was causing the slagging and shutdown of units of the defendant's
Reid-Gardner Plant, upon which
letter was based.

test

results

the March 20, 1984,

Prior to the isolation of the said train loads,

it was impractical and unreasonable for Nevada Power to determine
with any certainty that the Trail Mountain Mine coal was consistently causing slagging and foulinge
25.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 25, but alleges that

on or about May 10, 1984, ARCO suspended shipments

c5f coal

the Trail

said

Mountain

Mine and

notified

defendant

of

from

suspen-

sion.
26.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 26, and alleges that

Trail Mountain refused to provide coal that would meet the sodium
oxide content and refused to take any steps to provide a practical
and reasonable solution to its deficient coal: and alleges further
that in April, 1984, Trail Mountain
coal

by

Mountain

Norwest
coal

Company,

could

meet

who

procured

concluded

the

3

that

percent

the testing
none

maximum

of

of its

the

Trail

sodium

oxide

requirement.
27.
the only

Denies the allegations of paragraph 27 and alleges that
condition

that was

Diamond Shamrock was

communicated

that the coal meet

to Trail

Mountain

the contract

and

specifica-

tions: and defendant specifically denies that the conditions that
"perfect blending" was a requisite, or $1,000 was requested

per

day for damages, or that there would be a reduction in coal price,
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or

that

there was

a guaranty

that

the

blended

adversely affect operations of the Reid-Gardner
required*

coal

would

not

units were ever

The response to Diamond Shamrock's offer is evidenced

by a letter dated July 23/ 1984.
28.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 28/ but alleges that

on March

20/ 1984#

that

test

the

by letter defendant

results

showed

that

all

informed
of

the

Trail
coal

Mountain

deliveries

failed to meet the sodium test/ and informed Trail Mountain that
the coal purchases would be suspended in accordance with the contract provisions until the contract specifications

could be met.

Plaintiff thereupon confirmed through its own test that the coal
would not meet the specification.

No effort was made by Diamond

Shamrock

coal

to

remedy

the

defective

and

on

April

27/

1984/

Diamond Shamrock was again notified by letter that unless evidence
was furnished that the coal mixture would meet the quality specifications of the agreement by August 1/ 1984/ Nevada Power would
consider the agreement to be cancelled.

Said notice was a reason-

able notice and in accordance with Section 4.3 of the agreement
between the parties/ and Trail Mountain did not furnish or attempt
to furnish such evidence.
29.

Denies

the

allegations

of

paragraph

29

and

alleges

affirmatively that Plaintiff is not a party to the contract/

that

all of the alleged money damages are speculative and without substance

and

alleges

further

that

Trail

Mountain

has

failed

and

refused to mitigate any alleged losses by refusing to correct the
deficient coal supply and by failing and refusing
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to find other

purchasers for said coal*

Defendant alleges that the claimed dam-

ages are not the result of any breach of contract/ but are speculative and without foundation*
30.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 30*

31.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 31/ and alleges that

the claimed "irreparable injuries" are not irreparable/ that the
alleged difficulties are properly resolved and eliminated if the
plaintiff complies with the applicable Federal Coal Regulations/
including/

but

not

limited

to

the

provisions

of

30

C.F.R.

75.1171-1# 75.1171-3/ 30 C.P.R. 75e325 and 30 C.P.R. 75.330.

III.
CAUSES OF ACTION
Count I
32.

Defendant realleges and incorporates herein the admis-

sions/ denials and allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through
31 above.
33.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 33 for the reason

that it merely calls for a legal opinion/ and for the reason/ that
the terms of the contract are very specific in ennunciating the
responsibilities of the parties.
34.

Denies

alleges

that

Amended

Complaint

the

allegations

plaintiff/
and

itself/

through

of
in

the

Norwest Testing Laboratory admits

paragraph
the

34.

allegations

testing

it

Defendant
of

this

undertook

with

that the Trail Mountain coal

does not meet the sodium oxide content requirement of the con-

tract and in some instances does not meet the ash fusion

temper-

ature requirement of the Contract/ and the sodium quality and ash
fusion

temperature

contract

requirements are material/

and substantial elements of the Contract/

the failure

essential
to adhere

thereto being substantial breaches of the Contract/ which

impair

the value and usefulness of the coal; and further alleges affirmatively that the burning of the Trail Mountain coal which exceeds
the 3 percent sodium oxide maximum causes "slagging" and "fouling"
and has resulted
plant

in the shutdown of boilers of the Reid-Gardner

on several

different

occasions

causing

the defendant

to

incur additional costs over and above those ordinarily incurred in
the operation of the boiler/ of in excess of $64/000 per day per
boiler/

added

repair

plant efficiency.

and maintenance

costs

and a reduction

in

The failure of the coal to meet the aforesaid

quality requirements reasonably caused defendant sufficient apprehension as to the probable injurious effect on its boilers as to
justify requiring plaintiff to bring the coal back into the compliance with the contract quality requirements.
35.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 35 and alleges that

Trail Mountain by failing and refusing to comply with the contract
specifications

after reasonable and proper

materially

breached

accordance

with

notice

the contract by refusing

the contract

specifications/

to so comply/

to furnish

coal in

thus entitling

the

defendant to suspend shipments thereof and to thereafter terminate
the contract in accordance with paragraph 4.3.
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Count II
36*

Defendant

incorporates

herein and

realleges

the admis-

sions, denials and allegations contained in its answers 1 through
35 above*
37.
at

Denies the allegations of paragraph 37 and alleges that

such

time as

Trail Mountain

the defendant

coal

from

first

the other

was able
seven

to segregate

suppliers

the

of coal and

determine through testing that the Trail Mountain coal was deficient in its sodium oxide requirement/ defendant immediately notified plaintiff of such deficiency and requested that the plaintiff
comply with the terms of the contract/ all as is required and permitted under the terms of the contract; and alleges further that
from

the inception of the contract

owner and operator

knew;

but

in 1980/ Trail Mountain/

failed

to inform

defendant

fact that its coal did not meet this contract quality
tion.
tion/

of the

specifica-

Natomas Coal Company/ Diamond Shamrock Coal Sales Corporaand Diamond

Shamrock

Coal Company/

quality analysis/ having warranted
would

the

meet

knowing

the sodium

and

ash

failed

Nevada

of

Power

to

various

take

or

fusion

having

coal analysis

Nevada Power as to the probability

experts

in the contract
quality

that Nevada Power was not expert

nevertheless

being

in

coal

that the coal

requirements/

and

in such coal analysis,

taken/
which

of damage

failed

would

to

have

notify
alerted

to the defendant's

boilers and would have resulted in Nevada Power taking protective
steps to suspend shipments of coal earlier than it did.

Nevada

Power relied upon the representations of plaintiff and successors
as to coal quality*
38.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 38 and alleges that

defendant merely offered to the plaintiff the opportunity of reducing the coal shipments by 15 percent/ which offer was refused by
the plaintiff/ at which time the plaintiff unreasonably requested
an

increase

in

the

total

annual

contract

200/000 to 500/000 tons; and as a result/

tonnage

of

coal

no agreement

from

resulted

from the actions of the parties.

Defendant further alleges that

Nevada Power made the same offer

to seven other coal suppliers/

some of whom accepted the same and others of which rejected said
offer.

The matter with plaintiff was thereupon dropped.

39.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 39 and alleges that

defendant has always been ready/ willing and able to continue to
purchase the coal from Trail Mountain under the contract/

either

that coal which Trail Mountain has in its own mines or which it
could/

under

provided

that

specifications

the

provisions

said
and

coal

met

the

reasonable and necessary

of

coal

the

the

contract/

contract

quality

obtain

specifications/

required

thereunder

for the proper operation

d a n t s Reid-Gardner Plant.

elsewhere/
which
were

of the defen-

Defendant at no time used subterfuge

or in any other way attempted to eliminate coal shipments by Trail
Mountain or anyone else under the contract.
40.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 40.

Count III
41.

Defendant incorporates herein and realleges the allega-

tions/ admissions and denials contained in its answer under paragraphs 1 through 40 above.
42.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 42# and alleges that

both by the terms of the Uniform Commercial Code and by the provisions of paragraph 13 of the Nevada Power/Trail Mountain Contract/
plaintifffs claim for contract modification is barred.
43.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 43; and alleges that

the paragraph is indefinite/ establishes no specific terms either
as to coal quality or other contract provisions and alleges that
plaintifffs

knowledge as to the sodium

characteristics

or its

intent to claim a variation in the contract was only determined in
April 1984.

In fact/ the sodium quality of the Trail Mountain

coal is so inconsistent that no pattern was established between
1980 and 1984 and/ in fact/ varied from 1.78 percent to 6.02 percent/ with 11 out of 29 being 3.45 percent or less/ and ash fusion
temperature varying from 2100 to 2500 with 10 out of 23 being 2200
or higher.
44.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 44/ and alleges that

Nevada Power at no time refused to accept any Trail Mountain coal
that complied with

the contract

requirements/ and alleges that

Trail Mountain failed and refused to take any reasonable steps to
correct its deficient coal and instead suggested impossible conditions

with

trucks.
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its alleged

offer

to

combine

coal

by

alternating

Defendant further alleges that plaintiff failed to take

any of the steps which were available and which would have eliminated the problem/ thus mitigating any losses completely/ and reasonably refused to attempt to bring its coal to specification/ by
blending/ by mixing or by any other methods.

Count IV
45c

Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference

the allegations/

admissions and denials set forth

in its answer

under paragraphs 1 through 44 above.
46.
even

Denies the allegations of paragraph 46/ and alleges that

if

there

had

been

acquiescence

and

acceptance/

which

is

denied by defendant/ but which has been alleged by plaintiff/ said
acquiescence and acceptance does not modify the contract and does
not

lessen or eliminate any of the terms of the contract

specifically

provided

for under

the Uniform

Commercial

as is

Code and

under paragraph 13 of the contract.
47.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 47/ and alleges that

Trail Mountain knew from that its coal from time to time was deficient/ but failed to so inform Nevada Power/ and instead continuously assured Nevada Power that its coal met the specifications/
knowing that Nevada Power had no expertise in coal analysis/ and
failed to take any steps to correct the coal delivered
dant.

to defen-

Defendant alleges that Trail Mountain voluntarily/ at their

own election and without any reliance upon the actions/ inactions/
or alleged waiver by Nevada Power/

did continue

to operate/ did

seek and obtain other coal contracts/ and did not close the mine.

48.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 48.

COUNT V
49e

Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference

the allegations/ admissions and denials set forth in its answer
under paragraphs 1 through 48 above/ and alleges that since this
Count V is directed solely against Arco/ this defendant need not
respond.
50.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 50/ for the reason

that the contract speaks for itself and needs no legal conclusion
as to whether it is or is not an "installment contract".
51.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 51 as beyond the

issues to which this defendant must respond and because of insufficient information upon which to form a belief as to the truth
thereof.
52.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 52 as beyond the

issues to which this defendant must respond and because of insufficient information upon which to form a belief as to the truth
thereof.

COUNT VI
53.

Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference

the allegations/ admissions and denials contained in its answer
under paragraphs 1 through 52 above.
54.
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Denies the allegations of paragraph 54.

55.

Denies

affirmatively

the

allegations

that Trail Mountain

of

paragraph

55,

and

alleges

is neither an intended

nor an

incidental third-party beneficiary of such contract.
56.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 56/ and alleges that

the Trail Mountain coal was reasonably determined by Nevada Power
not to comply with

the coal quality

requirements

of

the Nevada

Power/Swisher Contract.
57.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 57/ and alleges that

at no time did Nevada Power ever refuse

to accept

coal

blended

with ARCO coal if such coal met the Trail Mountain/Nevada
quality

specifications

quality

requirements/

damages

resulting

between

the

and
and

any

therefrom

plaintiff

the

and

Nevada

claim

for

is only
ARCO,

Power/Swisher
breach

applicable

and

should

of
to

Power

contract

contract
the

or

contract

therefore

be

dis-

missed.

Count VII
58.

Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference

the allegations/

admissions

and denials

contained

in

its answer

under paragraphs 1 through 57 above.
59.

Admits

the allegations

of paragraph

relates to the Coal Supply Agreement/
Complaint/
alleges

but alleges

further

that

substance

assigned by the Fetterolf Group/ Inc.
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that said contract
in

59 insofar

the

attached

as it
to the

speaks for itself and
contract

has

not

been

60*

Denies the allegations of paragraph 60 as stated/ but

alleges that Trail Mountain Coal/ if it meets the coal quality
requirements reasonably required by Nevada Power# could be satisfactory for said use.
61*

Denies the allegations of paragraph 61/ and alleges fur-

ther that under the Uniform Commercial Code of Utah and under the
provisions of the contract/ the Agreement has not been amended/
nor have the quality requirements

in any way been modified or

reduced from those set forth in the original contract*
62.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 62.

63.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 63/ and alleges that

Nevada Power has the right under its contract to not accept coal
which does not meet the specification requirements set forth in
the Trail Mountain/Nevada Power Contract/

i.e./ a maximum

of 3

percent sodium oxide and a minimum of 2/200 degrees Fahrenheit
ash fusion temperature/ or which does not meet the requirements of
the Nevada Power/Arco Contract.

Count VIII
64.

Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference

the allegations/ admissions and denials contained

in its answer

under paragraphs 1 through 63 above.
65.

Admits that paragraph 2.2 of the contract provides that

substitute coal may be provided to NPC subject to NPCfs approval/
which approval will not be unreasonably withheld/ but alleges that
the said paragraph 2.2 also provides that such substitute coal

shall be subject to all other terms and conditions of this agreement; and that Trail Mountain/ in proposing to supply a mix of its
coal and another suppliers coal/ failed and refused to agree that
said coal should comply with the quality specifications governing
sodium oxide content and ash fusion temperatures/ which provisions
are some of the "other terms and conditions of this agreement";
and

that

because

defendant
the

accordance

has

plaintiff
with

the

not
has

unreasonably
not

contract

offered

to

conditions/

withheld

any

supply

such

and

denies

approval
coal

all

in

other

allegations of paragraph 65.
66.
of

its

Admits that Trail Mountain offered a substitute mixture
coal

and

another

supplier's

coal/

but

denies

all

other

allegations of paragraph 66/ and specifically denies that such an
offer was made in good faith because Trail Mountain knew its coal
could not comply with the specification/ also refused to have said
coal

comply

with

the

contract

specifications

and

proposed

an

unreasonable and unworkable method of attempting to mix said coals
and without authority of the proposed "other supplier".

Defendant

further alleges that said offer to substitute coal was made within
just a few days prior to the termination date set by the defendant
as August 1/ 1984/ without any attempt

to satisfy defendant that

said coal could meet the specifications; and that prior thereto in
April/

1984/

plaintiff's

own

testing

laboratory

had

determined

that plaintiff's coal could not meet the contract specifications.
67.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 67 and alleges that

the only condition

indicated by the defendant was that

the coal

would have to meet the contract requirements/ and that such a condition was reasonable and in accordance with the contract/ was
workable since plaintiff could have properly mixed such coal with
proper blending to come up with a substitute coal/ was not burdensome in that the relative cost to be employed by the plaintiff to
accomplish a coal which met specification was readily available to
the plaintiff/ and that said condition was in no way oppressive/
in that the plaintiff could easily and readily have undertaken the
steps to make the coal comply with the specification/ but unreasonably refused to do so.
68.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 68 and alleges fur-

ther that defendant has at all times been ready/ willing and able
to continue the contract performance with the plaintiff/ had the
plaintiff furnished coal to meet the contract specifications/ and
alleges further that Trail Mountain

has failed

and

refused

to

mitigate its claimed damages/ either by effectively blending the
coal or by seeking other purchasers/ both of which remedies have
been and are readily available.

Count IX
69.

Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference

the allegations/ admissions and denials hereinabove set forth in
its answer under paragraphs 1 through 68 above.
70.
these

Denies the allegations of paragraph 70# and alleges that

allegations

have

been

specifically

and

generally

denied

heretofore and to the extent that they have not/ defendant herein

denies specifically

and generally all allegations

of

this para-

graph 70.
71.

Denies the allegations of paragraph 71, and alleges that

the plaintiff has neither alleged a cause of action for a preliminary or a permanent injunction, has admitted that it breached the
contract, and has so breached since the inception of the contract
by refusing to furnish coal meeting the contract specification.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE CONCERNING BREACH OF CONTRACT

1.

Nevada Power constructed the Reid-Gardner Plant in four

different generating boilers, the order of construction and placing said boilers on line for generation was as follows:
No. 1 boiler:

Placed on line June 30, 1965;

No. 2 boiler:

Placed on line June 1, 1968;

No. 3 boiler:

Placed on line May 30, 1976; and

No. 4 boiler:

Placed on line July 26, 1983.

Boilers 1, 2, and 3 have particular specifications requiring that
coal used in the firing of said boilers would have a maximum of 3
percent sodium oxide in the ash and would require a minimum ash
fusion temperature of 2,200 degrees Fahrenheit, along with other
specific

requirements.

The

Trail

Mountain

specifically for use in boilers 1, 2, and 3.

coal

was

purchased

Separate coal con-

tracts were entered into with other suppliers to furnish coal for
Boiler Unit No. 4.

Nevada Power is unable to use coal in Units 1,

2, and 3 which does not meet the above specifications.

2.

Trail Mountain Utah and its agents were informed? during

negotiations and prior to execution of the Coal Sales Contract of
the fact that Nevada Power's Raid Gardner Generating Plants, boilers 1, 2, and 3 were constructed in such a way that they should
only be operated with coal having 3 percent or less sodium oxide
content in the ash and having ash fusion minimum temperatures of
2*200 degrees Fahrenheit*

Trail Mountain

Utah

represented

to

defendant in its written proposal to defendant prior to execution
of the Coal Sales Agreement that its coal from the Trail Mountain
mine met those specifications, and based upon these representations, defendant entered into the Coal Sale Agreement, Exhibit A,
attached

to

the

Complaint,

in which

said

specifications

were

included,
3,

During the contract negotiation Trail Mountain Utah knew

from at least one coal analysis that its coal would not meet the
specification, and after execution of the said contract and continuing thereafter to the present time, plaintiff Trail Mountain
Utah and then Trail Mountain had ordered and received several coal
analysis reports, some of which showed that the coal did not meet
the contract specifications concerning sodium oxide maximum percentages and ash fusion minimum temperatures.
4#

During performance of the contract, the defendant had

continuous difficulty in maintaining its boilers, which difficulty
was caused in part by the Trail Mountain coal.
regular

ASTM

testing, and

notwithstanding

However, through

complaints

to Trail

Mountain, defendant was unable to determine the exact cause for

the slagging and the continued operational problems in the boilers.

Notwithstanding these complaints/ the plaintiff continued to

assure

defendant

that

the

coal

met

all

contract

specification

requirements.
5.

In December/

1983/

defendant

encountered

more

serious

and continuous outages than had occurred over the past years in
its boiler operations/ and conducted a thorough investigation and
independent testing program to attempt to isolate the coal causing
the problem and to isolate the problem.

Said testing involved the

samples from five consecutive shipments taken from the Trail Mountain mine during the months of January/ February and one sample in
early March of 1984.
1984/

that

Trail

From these tests it was concluded in March/

Mountain

coal was

substantially

exceeding

the

sodium oxide maximum requirement of 3 percent and that this deficiency was jeopardizing

the operation of boilers 1/ 2,

and 3 in

the Reid-Gardner plant.
6.

On March 19/ 1984/ immediately after making such deter-

mination/ defendant/ at a conference with Trail Mountain representatives/

and

again

on March

20/ 1984/

by a letter

attached

Exhibit 1 to the original Answer filed herein/ suspended
Trail Mountain deliveries of coal until

it was shown

as

further

that Trail

Mountain coal met the specifications.
7.

Thereafter/ on April 16/ 1984/ Trail Mountain conducted

its own independent testing of the coal and said tests showed that
the Trail Mountain coal could not meet the sodium oxide specifications under the contract.

8C

On April 27, 1984, after

receiving

the Trail

Mountain

test and because of the immediate urgency in keeping the plant in
operation, Nevada Power gave written
paragraph

4C3

of

the

contract,

notice,

that

Trail

in accordance
Mountain

had

with
until

August 1, 1984, to show that the coal it was selling would meet
the specification*
9*

See Exhibit 2 attached to original Complaint*

On July 18, 1984, Trail Mountain offered to mix its coal

with the higher grade of coal to be obtained from Tower Resources,
another coal supplier in the area, which had a low sodium content,
and proposed to do this by simply alternating truck loads from the
Trail Mountain
proposal

mine and

was obviously

show or attempt

from

the Tower Resources

unworkable

for many

mine.

reasons

to show that the coal would

meet

did

not

the specifica-

tion, and on July 23, 1984, Nevada Power responded
requesting evidence

and

Such a

to the offer

that the coal would meet the specifications,

and at the same time questioned the practicality of such a mixing
process using alternate truck loads.

At all times since December

1983, defendant has consistently informed Trail Mountain

that the

only requirement it has is that the coal be supplied in accordance
with the quality terms of the contract*

However, the plaintiff,

at the same time, by its July 30, 1984 letter, refused to undertake any more efforts to furnish coal in accordance with the contract or to furnish any proof that its coal would meet the specification, but to the contrary, maintained

that

the contract

had

now been modified by its consistent furnishing of subspecification
materials

over

the

past

years,

and

Trail

Mountain

thereafter,

without further effort to mitigate its losses/ or to satisfy the
contract requirements, commenced this lawsuit.
10.

Paragraph 4.3 of the contract provides that Nevada Power

shall have the right to suspend further shipments of coal if two
consecutive shipments of coal do not meet the quality

specifica-

tions of paragraph 4.1/ i.e./ the 3 percent maximum sodium oxide
ash content and the 2/200 minimum ash fusion temperature requirements.
11.

Article 13 of the contract provides that the failure of

either party to insist in any one or more instances upon
performance

of any

of

the provisions

of

the agreement

strict
or

take

advantage of any of its rights hereunder shall not constitute a
waiver of any such provisions or the relinquishment
rights/
effect

and

such

for the

Trail Mountain

provisions

term

of

shall

continue

the agreement.

has agreed

that/

By

in
this

notwithstanding

of any such

full

force

and

paragraph/

the

its delivery of

subspecification coal/ it nevertheless cannot modify the terms and
conditions of the contract concerning quality of the coal/ and the
defendant by the same provisions and under the same circumstances/
has

the

effect.
tract

right

to

continue

such

provisions

in

full

force

and

The defendant continued in effect the coal quality con-

provisions/

and

the

plaintiff

materially

breached

those

quality provisions by refusing to furnish the assurance that its
coal would meet the specifications.
12.

Nevada Power cannot use coal in Units 1/ 2/ and 3 that

does not meet the sodium and ash fusion specifications.

Any such

use results in slagging and fouling and in the ultimate shutdowr
of

the boiler

involved

for a

period

of

time

while

the

boilei

cools, while it is cleaned, and while it gets back into operation/
all of which causes substantial extra cost? both in the remedying
of the problem and in the necessary purchase of supplemental powex
to be used in lieu of that which otherwise would be generated b^
such boiler.
13.

Section 70A-2-209(5), U.C.A., provides in substance that

a party who has made a waiver affecting an executory
the

contract

may

retract

that strict performance

the waiver

will

by

be required

reasonable
of any

portion of
notificatior

term which has

been waived, unless the retraction would be unjust

in view of a

material change of position in reliance on the waiver.
is the defendant's position

that even

if there was any

Thus, it
type oi

waiver as is alleged, the waiver has been retracted by an express
and reasonable notice to Trail Mountain so indicating; and that at
the same time there has been no change in position, either alleged
or claimed by plaintiff in reliance on the waiver.
14.
therefore

The

claims

of no avail

with prejudice.
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of

waiver

and

of

to the plaintiff

breach
and

of

should

contract
be

are

dismissed

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE CONCERNING
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
15.
relief/

As an affirmative defense
defendant

realleges

to the claim

paragraphs

for injunctive

1 through

14 under the

affirmative defense to plaintiff's claim for breach of contract.
16.
power

Nevada

Power

is a public

to Clark County

and portions

220/000 consumers
generating

taking

capacity

service

utility

of Nye County/

from Nevada

of Nevada Power

furnishing

Power.

electric

Nevada/

with

The total

is 1600 megawatts/

and the

actual connected base load to Nevada Power necessary to serve its
customers is approximately 1300 megawatts.
generating units 1/ 2,

The Reid-Gardner Plant

and 3/ supply 330 megawatts of power dedi-

cated to the base load requirements/ which power serves a portion
of Las Vegas/ Nevada.
megawatts.

Reid-Gardner

boiler No. 4 generates 250

The consumers of Nevada Power include the large casi-

nos/ such as the MGM Hotel/ which requires 45 megawatts/ about the
equivalent of the power requirements of the City of St.

George/

Utah.
17.

All of the power of the Reid-Gardner plant is necessary

for the complete service to Nevada Power's customers/ and in the
event that one of the boilers is shut down for a 24-hour period/
the power must be purchased from some other source/ and the cost
of purchase power is approximately $128/000 per day per boiler/ or
$64/000 per day per boiler/ in excess cost over and above the normal operating cost for said boiler for said period of time.
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18.

Section 4.2 of the Nevada Power/Trail Mountain Contract

requires that the buyer shall test each train load by ASTM standards.

Said testing, however, does not include testing for sodium

oxide content, nor ash fusion minimum temperatures.

The A.SeToM.

tests were carried on by Nevada Power for each of the train loads
of the Trail Mountain coal as it left the mine yard.

Testing for

sodium and ash fusion cannot be accomplished at the mine yard, but
can only

be performed

in a technical

time

procedure at the Nevada delivery point.
took

title at the Acco siding

and

consuming

laboratory

Under the contract Nevada

therefore

could

not

test

for

sodium and ash fusion until after it had received delivery at its
plant.

Nevada

representation

Power
that

thus had
the

coal

to
met

rely
the

upon

the Trail

sodium

and

Mountain

ash

fusion

requirement.
19.

Excessive sodium oxide ash content results in "slagging"

and "fouling" of a boiler and said slagging eventually results in
a loss of efficiency and eventually in a shutdown of that particular boiler, resulting in a loss in excess of $64,000 a day during
the

time

that

the

boiler

has

to

cool,

has

to be

cleaned,

and

thereafter put back on the line in service.
20.

The allegations of the Amended Complaint are couched in

terms of futuristic and speculative loss of profits or the occurrence of damages apparently

predicated

over

the

contract extending on into the indefinite future.
of the Amended Complaint

full

life

of a

The allegations

claim clearly that there are ascertain-

able contract damages in the event that Nevada Power breached the
contract.
21.

Plaintiff's claim based upon irreparable injury shows no

present danger to its existence

or to the public and

therefore

fails

essential

immediate

as

an

allegation

irreparable harm.

of

the

element

of

Said allegation fails to show that there is no

adequate legal remedy.
22.
ties/

In the balancing of relative hardships between the par-

there

immediately

is no allegation

or

claim

suffer any non-compensable

that

the

hardship.

plaintiff

will

The defendant/

on the other hand# if it is forced to accept said coal which does
not meet the specification

requirements/ will be forced

to close

its boilers and suffer for each boiler for each shutdown day the
cost of purchased power over and above the cost of operating
boiler in an amount of $64/000; and
are fairly and substantially

balanced

that the relative

the

hardships

in favor of the defendant/

rather than in favor of the plaintiff.
23.
affecting

The

policy

considerations

concerning

the public interest are caused/

mine

safety

or

if at all/ not by the

defendant terminating the contract/ but by Trail Mountain's failure

to comply with

the various mandatory

safety

requirements of

Chapter 30 of the C.F.R./ which governs the methods and procedures
by which a mine

is completely

continued in partial operation.

shutdown/

partially

shutdown/

or

The speculative hardships to the

public do not exist/ but for the improper or even negligent

fail

ure of the plaintiff to comply with the procedures to be followed
under the above regulations.
The final defect in plaintiffes claim in equity

24.

plaintiff's
hands.

failure

to come

into an equitable

court

is the

with

clean

The plaintiff entered into this contract after represent-

ing that its coal would meet the specifications/ but nevertheless *
knowing that the ccal did not meet the specifications and continuing

to maintain

that

the

coal

met

the

specifications

when/

in

fact/ the coal did not.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO THE CLAIM RELATIVE
TO THE ARCO-TRAIL MOUNTAIN CONTRACT
25*

The

ARCO-Trail

Mountain

contract

provides

that

Trail

Mountain shall sell and ARCO shall purchase 120/000 tons of coal
per year.
Nevada

The plaintiff/ in asking for an injunction "to require

Power

to inform

immediately

and

delivery and pay for Trail Mountain

instruct

ARCO

to accept

coal . . ." requires Nevada

Power to require specific performance by ARCO of its contract with
Trail

Mountain/

when

said

direction

should

properly

be

to Arco

under the Amended Complaint.

WHEREFORE/
each

of

its

defendant

counts

be

prays

that

dismissed

the

with

Amended

prejudice/

Complaint
defendant

and
be

awarded its costs incurred herein and be allowed such other relief
as may be equitable under the circumstances.

COUNTERCLAIM
Nevada

Power

Company

counterclaims

against

Trail

Mountain

Coal Company/ a California corporation/ plaintiff herein/ against
Diamond

Shamrock

Coal

Company/

a Delaware

corporation/

Natomas

Coal Company/ Diamond Shamrock Coal Sales Corporation/ and Diamond
Shamrock Corporation/
against

additional

a Delaware corporation/

parties

herein

which

is brought

by

counterclaim

virtue

of

the

Order of this Court heretofore entered on the 29th day of March/
1985/ and pursuant to Rule 13 H of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

Nevada Power Company is a public utility with its prin-

cipal place of business at Las Vegas/ Nevada/ being a Nevada corporation/ serving electric power to approximately 220/000 consumers

and

consumer

connections

in

Clark

County

and

Nye

County/

Nevada/ with the principal area of service at Las Vegas/ Nevada.
Nevada Power is authorized to do business in the State of Utah and
carries on a limited business in the State of Utah.
2.

Trail Mountain Coal Company/

a California

corporation/

plaintiff herein/ is the named plaintiff herein with its principal
office and place of business at Lexington/

Kentucky/

but with a

mine office situate at the Trail Mountain mine in Utah.
3.

On or about March 1/ 1980/ defendant entered into a Coal

Sales Agreement with Trail Mountain Coal Company/
ation/

a copy

of which

agreement

filed herein as Exhibit A.

is attached

to

a Utah corporthe

Complaint

4.

In 1981 Natomas Coal Company/ by corporate acquisition,

obtained all of the outstanding stock and assets of the said Trail
Mountain Coal Company and the said Trail Mountain Coal Company was
thereupon liquidated and ceased to do business.

By said acquisi-

tion* Natomas Coal Company ostensibly obtained all control, equitable and apparent legal interests and ownership in and to all
assets and liabilities of the said Utah company, including the
operations of the Trail Mountain mine*
pany established

In 1981 Natomas Coal Com-

the Trail Mountain Coal Company/

a California

corporation which is named as plaintiff herein, for the sole purpose of acting as an operating agent of Natomas Coal Company at
the Trail Mountain mine.
5.

From 1981 to 1983 Natomas Coal Company exercised all

indecia of legal and equitable ownership, control, rights, and
interest in and to the Trail Mountain mine and its coal operations, profits, losses and operating

facilities.

During

said

period, Natomas employed the mine manager and employees to operate
said mine for and on behalf of Natomas, and did receive and apply
for its own use and benefit all income produced from said mine,
including the payments from Nevada Power and other coal purchasers
under the subject Coal Sales Agreement and under other Coal Sales
Agreements entered into with various purchasers for the purchase
of coal from said mine.
6.

During said period from 1981 to 1983, Natomas fully and

completely directed the daily operations at the mine, had continuing and effective control and direction of the mining operations,

received all income from said operations and deposited same in its
own banking accounts/ paid from said bank accounts all payroll and
operating

expenses/

all accounts

payable/

all permit

fees and

other expenses necessary for the operation of said mine; and did
maintain the principle officers and directors of the Trail Mountain Coal Company Caliornia corporation as the same officers and
directors as did control the Natomas Coal Company*
period of time the main office/

the main

records/

During
such

said

as pay-

rolls/ accounts payable/ management reports/ were all prepared and
kept at the office of Natomas Coal Company/ and Natomas did exercise any and all elements of direct management/ control/ supervision and ownership of the mine and its operations/ and did employ
the Trail Mountain Coal Company California

corporation

solely as

an agent with the limited authority of doing the actual physical
mining and supervision at the mine.
7.

In September/ 1983/ the Natomas Coal Company was merged

into the Diamond Shamrock Corporation/

by which

merger/

Diamond

Shamrock Corporation acquired all stock/ assets/ legal and equitable ownership and interest in and to the Trail Mountain mine and
in and to the Trail Mountain
ation.

Coal Company/

a California

corpor-

At said merger/ Diamond Shamrock Coal Company became the

owner of all stock of the plaintiff herein and did undertake full
control/ supervision/ ownership/ operational responsibility/ right
to income/ obligation to pay accounts payable/ payroll and operating
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expenses/

and did thereupon

assume

all indecia

of owner

ship and did hold itself out to the industry as the owner of the
Trail Mountain mine and operations*
8.

The

Diamond

Shamrock

Coal

Company

did

continue

th€

employment of Trail Mountain Coal Company, the California corporation as its agents to provide operational services at the mine*
did employ the mine manager and the employees necessary to carr^
on the supervision and operation of the mine/ did give direct and
daily control of the mining operation, did make all decisions concerning operations, suspension

of operations, the cessation of

operations, and the acquisition of coal contracts and purchases
for said mine through Diamond Shamrock Coal Sales Corporation, die
exercise all control over the sales agreements between Diamond
Shamrock

Coal Company, acting

through

the Trail

Mountain

Coal

Company, California corporation.
9.

During said period of time, beginning in September 1983,

and continuing on to the present, Diamond Shamrock Coal Company,
Natomas Coal Company, a subsidiary
Company,

the California

Sales Corporation

thereof, Trail Mountain Coal

corporatin,

all had

and

substantially

directors and all of said companies
places

of

buiness

and

offices

at

Diamond
the same

maintained
1200

Shamrock

First

Coal

officers and

their principal
Security

Plaza,

Lexington, Kentucky, at which offices all of the major corporate
documents and accounting records for all companies were kept by
the

same

office

staff

and

accounting

personnel.

During

said

period of time, all monies received from coal sales from the Trail
Mountain mine were placed

into Diamond Shamrock Coal Company's

Dank accounts from which accounts payable/

operating expenses/

payrolls/ salaries/ permits/ fees and other expenditures were disbursed at the direction of Diamond Shamrock Coal Company.
10.

From September 1983 to the present time/ all correspon-

dence/ negotiations and other business transactions between Nevada
Power Company and the Trail Mountain Coal Company/ California corporation/ were carried on and conducted by the Diamond Shamrock
Coal Company officers and employees.
subject

litigation

was

authorized/

The commencement
initiated

and

of the

directed

by

Diamond Shamrock Coal Company/ acting through its officers in the
Diamond Shamrock Coal Sales corporation with authority and approval of Diamond Shamrock Coal Company.
12.

The Trail Mountain Coal Company California corporation

owns no interest/ nor right/ title/ either equitable or legal/ nor
any contractual rights in and to the Trail Mountain Mine or its
operation/ or the leases or permits relating thereto/ and all such
rights and title are owned and held by Diamond Shamrock Coal Company and/or Diamond Shamrock Coal Sales Corporation.
13.

Defendant

incorporates

and

realleges

all

allegations

hereinbefore set forth in its Affirmative Defenses.

First Cause of Action
14.

Nevada Power alleges for its first cause of action and

incorporates herein paragraphs 1 through 13 hereinabove alleged in
this Counterclaim.

15e

By

reason

of

counterclaim-defendant/

the

aforementioned

and

alleged

facts,

Diamond Shamrock Coal Company as princi-

pal^ owner and operator of the Trail Mountain mine, is doing business in the State of Utah, acting by and through its agent. Trail
Mountain Coal Company, a California corporation, plaintiff herein,
and as such, is subject
Court.

to the personal

jurisdiction

of this

The said Diamond Shamrock Coal Company, by reason of the

succession of interest as has been alleged, above, is responsible
for and has assumed liability for all of the prior actions and
conduct of the Trail Mountain Coal Company, the California corporation, and Natomas Coal Company,

its

immediate

predecessor

in

interest, as said liabilities relate to the operation of the Trail
Mountain mine.
16.

By reason of the breach

of the aforesaid

Coal Sales

Contract by Trail Mountain Coal Company, a California corporation,
by Diamond Shamrock Coal Company, by Diamond Shamrock Coal Sales
Corporation

and

by

Diamond

Shamrock

Corporation,

Nevada

Power

Company, defendant herein, has been damaged by reason of the shutdown of elements in the Reid-Gardner Plant by an amount in excess
of $64,000 per day for every day during which a boiler has been
shut down as a result of the failure of the said counterclaim
defendants to furnish the specified coal, and also in an undetermined amount for repairs to the boilers as a result of the burning
of said defective coal in said boilers; and defendant will be further damaged in an amount yet to be determined at trial representing the difference in price that the defendant may have to pay
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between the Trail Mountain Coal Sales Contract price and any substitute coal supplier or substitute power supplier.

Second Cause of Action
17.

Defendants Nevada Power, realleges paragraphs 1 through

16 in the first cause of action.
18.

The

California/

named

is

plaintiff/

merely

the

Trail

alter-ego

Mountain
of

Diamond

Company and in all matters hereinabove alleged/
Coal Company

is in fact the true and

Coal

Company*

Shamrock

Coal

Diamond Shamrock

responsible

entity

and

is

bound by all acts/ contracts/ and other liabilities of the plaintiff as though said acts/ contracts and failures to act are its
own.

Third Cause of Action
19.

Defendant

realleges paragraphs through 18 of the first

and second causes of action.
20.

Defendant

seeks

a

declaratory

judgment

of

this

Court

determining that the Coal Sales Agreement between the parties was
not modified and

that

legal effect pursuant

it has been properly
to Rule 57 of

cancelled

and

of no

the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure as implemented by 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

WHEREFORE/
Shamrock

Defendant

Coal Company/

prays

Diamond

for

judgment

Shamrock

against

Coal Sales

Diamond

Corporation/

Diamond Shamrock Corporation/ Natomas Coal Company and Trail Moun-

tain Coal Company, a California corporation, jointly and severally, in an amount to be determined at trial, but no less than
$64,000 per day for every day that a unit of the Reid-Gardner
Plant has been rendered idle or will be rendered idle by the time
of trial as a result of the breach of the Coal Sales Agreement,
for a judgment of an amount yet to be determined at trial for the
costs for undertaking and completing repairs to the boilers and
for a judgment determining that the Coal Sales Agreement of March
1# 1980, was not modified, that its quality provisions were in
effect and that the contract has been properly terminated, and for
declaratory judgment accordingly*

DATED this 5th day of June, 1985,
CYDE, PRATT, GIBBS & CAH00N

Nevada Power Company

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Amended

Answer to Plaintiff's Amended

Complaint, and

Amended Counterclaim of Nevada Power Company was mailed, postage
prepaid to the following on the

U"^

day of June, 1985;

William B. Bohling, Esq.
Kent T. Anderson, Esq.
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
1500 First Interstate Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Robert A. Peterson, Esq.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

APPENDIX 5
PLAINTIFF TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY'S
MOTION TO DROP DEFENDANT ATLANTIC RICHFIELD
COMPANY

William B. Bohling
Randall N. Skanchy
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, a
Cali fornia corporation,

vs.

PLAINTIFF TRAIL MOUNTAIN
COAL COMPANY'S MOTION TO
DROP DEFENDANT ATLANTIC
RICHFIELD COMPANY

NEVADA POWER COMPANY, a
Nevada corporation, and
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, a
Pennsylvania corporation

Civil No. C-84-0686A

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Trail Mountain Coal Company ("Trail
Mountain") by and through its counsel of record, Jones, Waldo,
Holbrook & McDonough, hereby moves this Court for an order
dropping defendant Atlantic Richfield Company pursuant to Rule
21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Said Motion is made on the grounds that the addition
of Atlantic Richfield Company, and the anticipated addition of
its wholly-owned subsidiary Beaver Creek Coal Company will

destroy the diversity jurisdiction in this case,
DATED this \\£ ^~ day of May, 1985.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

William B. Bohling
Randall N. Skanchy
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Trail Mountain Coal Company

^)

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the /*^t/. day of May, 1985, I
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing PLAINTIFF TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY'S MOTION
TO DROP DEFENDANT ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY to:

Elliott Lee Pratt,
Neil A. Kaplan
Clyde, Pratt, GibbsfitCahoon
77 West 200 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Robert A. Peterson
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
Attorneys for Defendant
Atlantic Richfield Company
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

K

&SHvis7r).9MQ«0

1986s
RNS

APPENDIX 6
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO DROP DEFENDANT ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY

William B. Bohling
Randall N. Skanchy
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, a
California corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NEVADA POWER COMPANY, a
Nevada corporation, and
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, a
Pennsylvania corporation

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
DROP DEFENDANT ATLANTIC
RICHFIELD COMPANY
Civil No. C-84-0686A

Defendants.

Plaintiff Trail Mountain Coal Company ("Trail
Mountain"), by and through its counsel of record, Jones, Waldo,
Holbrook & McDonough, hereby submits the following Memorandum
in support of Plaintiff's Motion to Drop Defendant Atlantic
Richfield Company ("Arco").
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On or about March 5, 1985, Calvin Gould, United States
Magistrate granted plaintiff's Motion for leave to file an

Amended Complaint and add defendant Arco as a party defendant.
On or about March 11, 1985, Arco was served with a summons and
an Amended Complaint.

Count V of the Amended Complaint is

directed against Arco and is based upon breach of contract of
the Trail Mountain/Arco contract.

That contract, a copy of

which is attacned as Exhibit "B" to the Amended Complaint, was
by and between Trail Mountain and Swisher Coal Company
("Swisher").

In Arco8s Motion to Dismiss the Amended

Complaint, it sets forth the allegations that Beaver Creek Coal
Company ("Beaver Creek"), as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Arco,
succeeded to the duties and liabilities of Swisher under the
Trail Mountain/Arco contract, which provides the foundation for
plaintiff's claim against Arco.
and Authorities, p* 2*)

(Arco's Memorandum of Points

Thus, Trail Mountain should either

join Beaver Creek in this action or voluntarily dismiss its
c^aim against Arco, and pursue Arco and Beaver Creek in a
separate action.

However, the joinder of Beaver Creek, a

Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Utah, would destroy the diversity jurisdiction of this court
because Trail Mountain, a California corporation, also has its
principal place of business in Utah.

Accordingly, Trail

Mountain moves this Court to drop Arco as a party to this suit
in order to maintain diversity jurisdiction and permit this
Court to proceed with Trail Mountain's claims against Nevada

LEGAL ARGUMENT
Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that:
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for
dismissal of an action. Parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on
motion of any party or of its own initiative
at any stage of the action and on such terms
aa are just. Any claim against a party may
be severed and proceeded with separately.
(Emphasis added)
Courts frequently employ Rule 21 to preserve diversity
jurisdiction by dropping a non-diverse party if its presence is
not indispensable.

See, Caperton v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal

Co., 585 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1978);

Jett v. Phillips &

Associates, 439 F.2d 987, 990-991 (10th Cir. 1971);

7 Wright &

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure; Civil, § 1685, at 332
(1972).

A motion to drop a party under this Rule is addressed

to the discretion of the court, and the Tenth Circuit has held
that parties may be dropped "in order to achieve the requisite
diversity of citizenship."
supra, at 990-991.

Jett v. Phillips & Associates,

Only if the party sought to be dropped is

indispensable within the meaning of Rule 19 may the court not
make such an order.

Id. at 991.

As noted above, Beaver Creek is a Delaware corporation
with its alleged principal place of business in Utah*

Trail

Mountain, a California corporation also has its principal place
of business in Utah.

For the purposes of diversity

jurisdiction, a corporation is a citizen of the state in which
it is incorporated and the state wherein it has its principal
place of businesso

See, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).

As such, the

addition of Arco, and the necessary addition of Beaver Creek as
the successor in interest to the Trail Mountain/Arco agreement
would destroy the diversity jurisdiction of this Court.
Neither Arco or Beaver Creek are indispensable parties
to plaintiff's claims of breach of contract against defendant
Nevada Power Company.

Although the Trail Mountain/Arco

agreement forms the basis for two of plaintifffs claims against
Nevada Power, (Count VI for breach of contract as a third party
beneficiary and Count VII for interference and inducement to
breach contract), the law is clear that Arco and/or Beaver
Creek are not indispensaole parties to this action. See,
Arkansas v.Texas, 346 U.S. 368 (1953) (in an action for
inducement to breach a contract the party prevented from
performing the contract is not an indispensable party); Manning
v. Wiscombe, 498 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1974) (suit for breach of
contract may be brought by a third party beneficiary without

the joinder of all parties to the contract)*

As such, this

court should exercise its discretion to drop Atlantic Richfield
Company as a party from this lawsuit•
DATED this /</ &- day of May, 1985.
JONES, V^ALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

William B. Bohlmg
Randall N. Skanchy
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Trail Mountain Coal Company

j)

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the )'Jt^

day of May, 1985, I

caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
DROP DEFENDANT ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY to:

Elliott Lee Pratt,
Neil A. Kaplan
Clyde, Pratt, Gibbs & Cahoon
77 West 200 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

-5-

Robert Ac Peterson
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
Attorneys for Defendant
Atlantic Richfield Company
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Pc 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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APPENDIX 7
STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL
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CLFRK
William B. Bohling
Randall N. Skanchy
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, a
California corporation,
STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff,
vs.
NEVADA POWER COMPANY, a
Nevada corporation, and
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, a
Pennsylvania corporation

Civil No. C-84-0686G

Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED pursuant to Rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by Trail Mountain Coal Company
("Trail Mountain") as plaintiff and Nevada Power Company
("Nevada Power") as defendant, by and through their counsel,
that the above-entitled action, including the Amended Complaint
and Amended Counterclaim on file herein, and all claims made by
plaintiff Trail Mountain against defendant Nevada Power and

defendant Nevada Power against plaintiff Trail Mountain, be,
and hereby are dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear its
own costs«

The grounds for this stipulation are that the

matter has been fully compromised and settled between plaintiff
Trail Mountain and defendant Nevada Power.
DATED this /fc ^

day of August, 1985.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

t^Si.LLD

By
William B. Bohling
Randall N. Skanchy
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CLYDE &

Elliott L6e^Pratt
Edwin Co Barnes
Attorneys for Defendant
Nevada Power Company
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of August, 1SG5,

I caused to be delivered by hand, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Stipulation of Dismissal to:
Elliott Lee Pratt, Esq.
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APPENDIX 8
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

William B. Bohling
Randall N. Skanchy
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, a
California corporation,
Plaintiff,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

vs.
NEVADA POWER COMPANY, a
Nevada corporation, and
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, a
Pennsylvania corporation

Civil No. C-84-0686G

Defendants.

Based on a stipulation of Plaintiff and Defendant
Nevada Powe.: Company, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the above-entitled action,
including the Amended Complaint and Amended Counterclaim on
file herein and all claims made by plaintiff Trail Mountain
Coal Company ("Trail Mountain") against defendant Nevada Power
Company, and defendant Nevada Power Company against plaintiff

-2-

Trail Mountain, be, and hereby are, dismissed with prejudice
with each party to bear its own costs.
Based on Defendant Atlantic Richfield1s motion to
dismiss the amended complaint for lack of diversity
jurisdiction, and Plaintiff's motion to drop Atlantic Richfield
as a party, and for good cause appearing,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Amended Complaint on
file herein and all claims made by plaintiff Trail Mountain
against Defendant Atlantic Richfield Company, be, and hereby
are dismissed without prejudice with each party to bear its own
costs.

, j^

DATED this
i 8 / \6 ~*~ day of August, 1985.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

A*4*^

'. /Thomas Greene
APPROVED:
JO»ES, WALDO, HOLFROOK & McDONOUGH

ns^ji^

William B. Bohling
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CLYDE & PRATT

''4t#/£s^ s?6K

Elliott Lee^Pratt
Attorneys for Defendant Nevada Power
r*^mrsa r\\T

ATTEST: A TRUE COPY
PAW. L BADGER, CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH

BY
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APPENDIX 9
RULE 26, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 26

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 26

(d) Public Officers; Death or Separation From Office. When a public officer
is a party to an action and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise
ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or
against his successor, if within 6 months after the successor takes office, it is
satisfactorily shown to the court that there is a substantial need for so
continuing and maintaining i t Substitution pursuant to this rule may be
made when it is shown by supplemental pleading that the successor of an
officer adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his
predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected,
unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of the
application therefor and accorded'an opportunity to object.
I General Consideration.
II. Death.
L GENERAL CONSIDERATION

defendant died and his death was immediately
noted upon the court record, but plaintiff never
o * C i ^ m ™ A 1 1 ^ d V ' A i l r e d ' 1 2 U t a h 2 d 3 2 5 , m o v e d f o r a substitution of parties nor asked
3 6 6 R 2 d 4 7 8 (1961)
*
for an enlargement of the 90-day period within
II. DEATH
which to seek substitution, it was not error for
the trial court to dismiss the complaint.
No error in dismissing complaint for Connelly v. Rathjen, 547 P.2d 1336 (Utah
failure to move to substitute. Where a 1976).

PART V.
DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY,
Rule 26. General Provisions Governing Discovery,
(a) Discovery Methods. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the
following methods: Depositions upon oral examination or written questions;
written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to
enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical
and mental examinations; and requests for admission. Unless the court orders
otherwise under subdivision (c) of this rule, the frequency of use of these
methods is not limited.
(b) Scope of Discovery. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in
accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In General Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party
seeking discovery, or to the claim or defense of any other party, including
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial
48
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if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
(2) Insurance Agreements. A party may obtain discovery of the
existence and contents of any insurance agreement under which any
person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or
all of a judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or
reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. Information
concerning the insurance agreement is not by reason of disclosure
admissible in evidence at trial. For purposes of this paragraph, an
application for insurance shall not be treated as part of an insurance
agreement.
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and
tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this
rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party or by or for that other party's representative (including his
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required
showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney
or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement
concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party.
Upon request, a person not a party may obtain without the required
showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that person. If the request is refused, the person may move
for a court order. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of
expenses incurred in relation to the motion. For purposes of this
paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a written statement
signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a
stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription
thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by
the person making it and contemporaneously recorded.
(4) Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions
held by experts under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this rule may
be obtained only as follows:
(A) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an
expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party
in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial only as provided
by Rule 35 or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under
which the party seeking discovery is not able to obtain the discovery
of requested facts or opinions on the same subject by other means, or
otherwise upon a showing that manifest injustice would result unless
discovery is permitted.
49
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(B) If discovery is permitted under Rule 26 (b) (4) (A), (i) the court
shall, unless manifest injustice would result, require that the party
seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in
responding to discovery; and (ii) the court may require the party
seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and
expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts
and opinions from the expert.
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the
following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had
only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or
place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other
than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not
be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain
matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons
designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only
by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only
in a designated way; (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified
documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as
directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person
provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award
of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
(d) Sequence and Timing of Discovery. Unless the court upon motion, for
the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders
otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that
a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not
operate to delay any other party's discovery.
(e) Supplementation of Responses. A party who has responded to a request
for discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no duty
to supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired, except
as follows:
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with
respect to any question directly addressed to (A) the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity
of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the
subject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his
testimony.
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he
obtains information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the
50
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response was incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the response
though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are
such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing
concealment.
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the
court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new
requests for supplementation of prior responses.
(f) Deposition Where Action Pending in Another State. Any party to an
action or proceeding pending in another state, may take the deposition of any
person within this state, in the same manner and subject to the same
conditions and limitations as if such action or proceeding were pending in this
state; provided, that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of
such deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which
the person whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served; and
provided further that all matters arising during the taking of such deposition
which by the rules are required to be submitted to the court shall be
submitted to the court in the county where the deposition is being taken.
I. General Consideration.
II. Scope of Discovery.
A. In General.
B. Insurance Agreements.
C. Trial Preparationc
1. Materials.
2. Experts.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION
The purposes of discovery rules are to
make discovery as simple and efficient as
possible by eliminating any useless ritual,
undue rigidities or technicalities which may
have become engrafted in the law, and to
remove elements of surprise or trickery so that
the parties and the court can determine the
facts and resolve the issues as directly, fairly
and expeditiously as possible. Ellis v. Gilbert,
19 Utah 2d 189,429 P.2d 39 (1967).
Rule applicable to action to remove public official for malfeasance. The taking of
depositions pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is applicable in an action to remove
a public official from office for malfeasance
pursuant to § 77-7-2, U.C.A. 1953. State v.
Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12 (1961).
Cited in Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695
(Utah 1977).

clarifying the issues on which contest may
prove to be necessary. State ex rel. Road
Comm'n v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P.2d 914
(1966).
But not so as to yield a "fishing expedition." The use of discovery should not be
extended to permit ferreting unduly into detail, nor to have the effect of cross-examining
the opposing party or his witnesses, nor should
it be distorted into a "fishing expedition." State
ex reL Road Comm'n v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382,
412 P.2d 914 (1966).
Any matter which will help resolve a
lawsuit is "relevant." The ultimate objective
of any lawsuit is a determination of the dispute
between the parties, and whatever helps to
attain that objective is "relevant" to the lawsuit. Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d
39(1967).
B. Insurance Agreements

II. SCOPE OF DISCOVERY

Insurance agreements
discoverable.
Through discovery, a plaintiff should have
some means of discovering whether an insurance policy exists and what its provisions are,
so that he can know whether covenants upon
which his rights may depend are being com-

A. In General
Discovery should be liberally permitted
where it is used in eliminating non- controversial matters and in identifying, narrowing and
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